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BUREAU OF MINES / ?' 

INFORMATION CIRCULAR/1989 




Review of Recent Research on 
Organizational and Behavioral 
Factors Associated With Mine 
Safety 

By Robert H. Peters 



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 



Mission: Asthe Nation's principal conservation 
agency, the Department of the Interior has respon- 
sibility for most of our nationally-owned public 
lands and natural and cultural resources. This 
includes fostering wise use of our land and water 
resources, protecting our fish and wildlife, pre- 
serving the environmental and cultural values of 
our national parks and historical places, and pro- 
viding for the enjoyment of life through outdoor 
recreation. The Department assesses our energy 
and mineral resources and works to assure that 
their development is in the best interests of all 
our people. The Department also promotes the 
goals of the Take Pride in America campaign by 
encouraging stewardship and citizen responsibil- 
ity for the public lands and promoting citizen par- 
ticipation in their care. The Department also has 
a major responsibility for American Indian reser- 
vation communities and for people who live in 
Island Territories under U.S. Administration. 



Information Circular 9232 



Review of Recent Research on 
Organizational and Behavioral 
Factors Associated With Mine 
Safety 

By Robert H. Peters 



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
Manuel Lujan, Jr., Secretary 

BUREAU OF MINES 
T S Ary, Director 



TM 



4 



Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data: 



Peters, Robert H. 

Review of recent research on organizational and behavioral factors associated with 
mine safety / by Robert H. Peters. 

38 p. cm.-(Information circular / Bureau of Mines; 9232) 

Bibliography: p. 15 

Supt. of Docs, no.: I 28.27:9232. 

1. Mine safety. 2. Mineral industries-Personnel management. 3. Miners-Psy- 
chology. 4. Mine safety-Research-United States. 5. Mineral industries-Person- 
nel management-Research-United States. 6.Miners-Psychology-Research-United 
States. I. Title. II. Series: Information circular (United States. Bureau of Mines); 
9232. 

TN295.U4 622s-dc20 [622'.8] 89-600152 CIP 



CONTENTS 

Page 

Abstract 1 

Introduction 2 

Review of research findings 2 

Organizational factors 4 

Training for miners 4 

Training for managers and supervisors 5 

Management planning 5 

Management commitment to safety 5 

Production competition between crews 6 

Production pressure 6 

Equipment availability 6 

Safety and health equipment maintenance 6 

Safety-production incentive program 6 

Safety disciplinary actions 6 

Size of mine 6 

Feedback and praise 7 

Night shift work 7 

Employee control 7 

Worker participation in problem solving 7 

Worker autonomy 8 

Decentralized decision making 8 

Management-labor relations 8 

Overall labor relations climate 8 

Management concern for labor 9 

Labor support for safety discipline 9 

Supervisor-employee interaction 9 

Reporting hazards to supervisor 9 

Employee development 9 

Praise for working safely 9 

Communications to miners 9 

Individual miner 10 

Absenteeism 10 

Coworker relations 10 

Role ambiguity 11 

Role overload 11 

Role conflict 11 

Age 11 

Overview of findings and their limitations 12 

Recommendations for improving mine safety 12 

References 15 

Appendix-Annotated bibliography 16 

TABLES 

1. Description of empirical studies of organizational and behavioral factors affecting mine safety 3 

2. Summary of organizational and behavioral variables associated with mine safety 4 

A-l. Injury rates for companies using versus not using each safety policy 25 

A-2. Lost-time accident frequency rates before and after institution of nonmonetary safety incentive program . 26 



UNIT OF MEASURE ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT 


ft foot mt 


metric ton 


f^/min cubic foot per minute pet 


percent 


h hour st 


short ton 


min minute yr 


year 



R |SinPA R , E cf^ R A SEARCH 0N ORGANIZATIONAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH MINE SAFETY 



By Robert H. Peters 1 



ABSTRACT 



This report presents a literature review conducted by the U S Bureau of Min« tk 
the appendix. P g satety * ^ annot ated bibliography section appears in 



Research psychologist, Pittsburgh Research Center, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. 



INTRODUCTION 



Research on organizational and behavioral factors in 
the mining industry represents a promising approach to the 
improvement of miners' safety. Such research projects are 
usually very expensive and often require several years to 
perform. Because they are so costly, it is important that 
researchers begin their studies by reviewing any work that 
has already been performed. Learning what others have 
done improves their understanding of the problem and 
their ability to design an effective study. 

The purpose of this U.S. Bureau of Mines report is to 
provide researchers and mining industry officials with a 
review of the recent United States research literature 
concerning the relationship between mine safety and 
characteristics of miners, mine management, and mining 
companies. Using computer literature search services, it 
was found that 17 empirical studies on this topic had been 
published in the United States during the years 1976 
through 1988. For a review of the foreign literature on 
this topic, see Peters (23). 2 

The body of this report is organized into three major 
sections. The first section reviews the research findings 



concerning 16 company-level variables; three variables 
concerning the amount of control employees have over 
what happens on the job, three variables related to man- 
agement-labor relations, four variables related to super- 
visor-employee interactions, and six variables pertaining to 
individual miners. The second section presents an over- 
view of the findings, and makes some statements concern- 
ing the use of caution in interpreting the findings given the 
nature of the experimental designs and research methods 
that were used in most of these studies. The third section 
presents recommendations about improving mine safety 
that were given by the authors of the 17 studies reviewed 
in this report. This report also contains an appendix, 
which gives the following information about each of the 17 
studies: the references for publications concerning the 
study, the study's objective, the methods used to perform 
the study (including a brief description of experimental 
interventions and data analysis procedures), the results, 
and (where applicable) major conclusions. 



REVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 



Table 1 lists the studies included in this review and 
indicates the following about each: the experimental 
design, the type of ore mined, whether surface or under- 
ground, the number of mines or companies from which 
data were collected, and the manner in which mine safety 
was measured. 

The experimental design. The studies that look for 
naturally occurring relationships between variables and 
measures of mine safety by collecting data at only one 
point in time are labeled correlational. One study used a 
cross-lag panel design (27). Data were collected at two 
points in time, and the effect of changes in the correlates 
on changes in safety measures were examined. This is a 
relatively good design because it allows one to make better 
inferences about the direction of causality. In the correla- 
tional and cross-lag panel studies, the effects of planned 
changes on mine safety were not studied. Other studies, 
labeled interventions, involve observing the effects of some 
planned change (e.g., a new training program) on indexes 
of mine safety. Measures of mine safety are taken before 
and after the intervention is introduced, and inferences are 
made about the role of the intervention in producing 
observed changes in safety. Unfortunately, given the 
frequent lack of adequate control sites, and the complexity 
of the interventions, it is often quite difficult to determine 



Italic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 
preceding the appendix at the end of this report. 



precisely what was responsible for the observed improve- 
ments in safety. In instances where control sites are 
used, this design allows one to make relatively strong 
inferences about the existence of causal relationships 
between variables. 

A technique often used in performing research on 
company-level determinants of employee safety is to look 
for factors that differentiate between companies that have 
established records of good versus poor safety performance 
(7). This type of study is labeled the contrast design. 
Typically, data are collected on a very large number of 
factors, and statistical tests are performed to see which 
factors differentiate between the two groups of companies 
at a statistically significant level. There are some impor- 
tant limitations to this type of study: (1) When considering 
a large number of factors, one should expect to observe a 
certain number of statistically significant relationships 
between variables that, in reality, are not related to one 
another; (2) one cannot specify the direction of causality, 
or the extent to which two variables are influencing each 
other in a reciprocal manner; (3) one cannot rule out the 
possibility that the observed relationship might be because 
of the influence of some unmeasured variable that is highly 
correlated with the ones measured. In other words, it may 
be the case that the measured variable is not the true 
cause of differences in safety performance; rather, the true 
cause influences both safety performance and the variable 
found to be correlated with safety performance. 



Table 1 .-Description of empirical studies of organizational and behavioral factors affecting mine safety (1976-1988) 



Investigator 
and reference 



Design 



Mine type 



Sample size 



Safety index 



Althouse (7) . . 

Bell (3) 

Bennett (4) . . . 
DeMichiei (9) . 
Edwards (10) . 
Fiedler (72) . . 
Gaertner (74) . 
Goodman (16) 
Goodman (17) 
Goodman (78) 
NAS (27): 

1 st data set 

2d data set . 

3d data set . 
Peters (24) . . . 

Do 

Do 

Pfeifer (25) . . . 
Rhoton (26) . . 
Sanders (27) . 
Uslan (30) . . . 
Wagner (37) . . 



Contrast . . . 
Intervention . 
Correlational 
Contrast . . . 
Intervention . 

. . do 

Correlational 
Intervention . 

. . do 

Correlational 



Underground coal . 
Underground silver 
Underground coal . 

. . do 

Surface coal 

Underground trona 
Underground coal . 

. . do 

. . do 

. . do 



29 mines . . . 

1 mine 

All U.S. coal . 
40 mines . . . 

1 mine 

. . do 

10 companies 
1 mine 

4 mines .... 

5 mines .... 



. . do 

. . do 

Contrast 

Intervention . . . 

. . do 

. . do 

Contrast 

Intervention . . . 
Cross-lag panel 
Intervention . . . 
Correlational . . 



. . do 

. . do 

. . do 

Surface gold .... 
Surface coal .... 
Underground coal 

. . do 

. . do 

. . do 

Underground salt 
Surface iron .... 



All U.S. coal . 
19 companies 
12 mines . . . 

1 mine 

2 mines .... 
. . do 

28 mines . . . 

1 mine 

22 mines . . . 
4 mines .... 
10 mines . . . 



Not available. 

Lost time. 

Lost time, non-lost time. 

Not available. 

All. 

All, violations. 

Do. 
All, violations. 2 
Lost time. 
All. 

Multiple. 3 

Do. 3 
Lost time. 
All, hazards. 

Do. 

Do. 
Not available. 
Hazards. 
Lost time. 
Selected. 4 
Days lost. 



NAS National Academy of Sciences. 

^pendent variable was a dichotomous indicator of whether the injury was considered a lost-time or non-lost-time incident. 

2 Five measures from Government safety inspectors were used: total MSHA violations per section, total State violations per section, number 
of times section was closed down, quarterly global ratings of section safety by Federal inspectors, and quarterly global ratings of section safety 
by State inspectors. 

Rates for several categories of injuries and accidents were computed, including fatalities, lost-time incidents, non-lost-time incidents, and 
serious incidents. 

"Total number of eye, head, hand, and back injuries per month. 



Safety indexes. The most commonly used measure of 
mine safety is the rate of lost-time injuries reported to 
the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) per 
200,000 employee hours of exposure. Some studies used 
the rate of total injuries reported to MSHA per 200,000 
employee hours of exposure. This measure is designated 
by "all". Some critics argue that the lost-time injury rate 
is a more valid index for assessing differences in safety 
performance than the "all" injury rate because there could 
be significant variations in the extent to which mine oper- 
ators actually report non-lost-time injuries to MSHA. 
Some studies have defined the measure of safety more 
narrowly, and have used the rate of injuries to selected 
body parts, etc. Another measure of safety commonly 
used is the severity of the injury. Severity is operationally 
defined as the number of workdays missed following the 
injury. 3 Another measure of safety is the number of 
violations issued by mine inspectors. Finally, some studies 
have defined safety in terms of the number of hazardous 



Although none of the studies in this review used it, another 
potentially useful measure of accident severity would be an index that 
normalizes the number of workdays lost by the number of hours 
worked, e.g., number of lost workdays per 200,000 employee hours. 



conditions or instances of unsafe work practices observed 
during periodic inspections of the worksite. 

Except for the studies by Edwards (10), Goodman (15- 
18), Peters (24), and Uslan (30), all these studies used data 
provided by MSHA to compute rates of accidents, injuries, 
and violations, and to define injury severity. Severity is 
usually defined as the number of days away from work 
following the injury. With the exception of the studies 
by Bennett (4), Edwards (10), and Rhoton (26), all the 
studies were funded by agencies of the U.S. Government, 
primarily the Bureau. 

Table 2 lists the organizational and behavioral variables 
that have been found related to some measure of mine 
safety at the probability (p) < 0.05 level of statistical sig- 
nificance. Positive relationships to mine safety should be 
interpreted as: increases in variable X (or the presence or 
use of X) are associated with a better safety record. Nega- 
tive relationships to mine safety should be interpreted as: 
increases in variable X (or the presence or use of X) are 
associated with a poorer safety record. The variables are 
organized into five categories: organizational, employee 
control, management-labor relations, supervisor-employee 
interaction, and individual miner. The empirical evidence 
concerning each of the variables listed in table 2 is dis- 
cussed in the following pages. 



Table 2.-Summary of organizational and behavioral variables associated with mine safety 



Variable 



Investigator and 
reference 



Association 
direction 



Organization: 
Training for miners 

Do 

Training for managers and supervisors . . . 

Do 

Do 

Management planning 

Management commitment to safety . . . 

Do 

Production competition between crews . 
Production pressure 

Do 

Equipment availability 

Safety & health equipment maintenance 
Safety-production incentive program . . . 

Safety disciplinary actions 

Size of mine 

Feedback and praise 

Night shiftwork 

Employee control: 
Worker participation in problem solving 

Do 

Do 

Worker autonomy 

Do 

Decentralized decisionmaking 

Management-labor relations: 

Overall labor relations climate 

Management concern for labor 

Do 

Labor support for safety discipline .... 
Supervisor-employee interaction: 

Reporting hazards to supervisor 

Employee development 

Praise for working safe 

Do 

Communications to miners 

Individual miner: 
Absenteeism 

Do 

Do 

Coworker relations 

Role ambiguity 

Do 

Role overload 

Role conflict 

Do 



DeMichiei (9) 
Pfeifer (25) . . 
Fiedler (12) . , 
Peters (24) . , 
Uslan (30) . . , 
DeMichiei (9) 

. . do 

Pfeifer (25) . , 

. . do 

. . do 

Sanders (27) , 
DeMichiei (9) 
Pfeifer (25) . 
Gaertner (14) 

. . do 

NAS (21) .... 
Rhoton (26) 
Wagner (31) 



Edwards (10) 

Bell (3) 

DeMichiei (9) 
Goodman (16) 
Sanders (27) . 
DeMichiei (9) 



Gaertner (14) 
DeMichiei (9) 
Pfeifer (25) . 
DeMichiei (9) 



Pfeifer (25) . 
Sanders (27) 
Pfeifer (25) . 
Uslan (30) . . 
DeMichiei (9) 



Goodman (78) 
DeMichiei (9) 
Pfeifer (25) . . 

. . do 

. . do 

Althouse (1) . 
Pfeifer (25) . . 

. . do 

Sanders (27) . 
NAS (21) 



Positive. 

Do. 

Do. 1 

Do. 1 

Do. 1 

Do. 

Do. 

Do. 
Negative. 

Do. 

Do. 
Positive. 

Do. 

Do. 

Do. 

Do. 

Do. 1 
Negative. 2 

Positive. 1 
Do. 1 
Do. 
Do. 1 
Do. 
Do. 

Do. 

Do. 
Do. 
Do. 

Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 
Do. 

Negative. 

Do. 

Do. 
Positive. 
Negative. 
Positive. 
Negative. 

Do. 

Do. 
Positive. 



Variable was only one of several changes introduced more or less simultaneously as part of a complex organizational intervention. It is 
not clear how much, if any, of the observed effects on safety should be attributed to this variable. 
Occidents experienced on night shift are more severe than those experienced on day or afternoon shifts. 



ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS 

This category of variables includes factors other than 
management-labor relations that characterize or that affect 
the entire mining operation or company, such as the size 
of the operation, management's emphasis on achieving 
various objectives, use of safety policies and practices, 
company-wide training programs, etc. These variables 
describe organizational level characteristics (as opposed to 
characteristics of individuals or workgroups within the 
organization) that have been examined in studies of mine 
safety performance. 



Training for Miners 

DeMichiei (9) made the following observations of 
significant differences in the mean responses of mine 
managers and safety officials from high- versus low- 
accident rate mines: (a) new miners in high-accident rate 
mines were less informed on how to do their jobs than 
new miners in low-accident rate mines, (b) supervisors at 
high-accident rate mines did not provide the same degree 
of instruction and guidance to miners as did supervisors in 
low-accident rate mines. 



Pfeifer (25) made the following observations of signifi- 
cant differences in the mean responses of miners from 
high- versus low-accident rate mines: (a) there is a con- 
sistent tendency for training on various topics to be rated 
as better by underground miners at low-accident mines, 
(b) good training in how the electrical power system 
works, dealing with hazards (such as gases, coal dust, and 
noise), and how to use tools and equipment is more prev- 
alent in mines with lower accident rates, and (c) lack of 
training in the proper use of safety and health equipment 
was more frequently cited as being an important reason 
for not using the equipment by miners at high-accident 
mines. 

Training for Managers and Supervisors 

A major focus of three intervention studies that pro- 
duced significant improvements in safety was the provision 
of training for managers and supervisors. Fiedler (11) 
used a training intervention called the Leader Match 
program. This program teaches individuals to diagnose 
their own leadership styles, as well as to diagnose the 
leadership situations. The leaders are given detailed 
instruction on various methods for modifying the situations 
to match their particular management approaches and 
personalities. The instruction is provided by a trainer, who 
uses a detailed manual, aided by videotaped illustrations, 
slides, and/or transparencies. Videotaped vignettes in 
actual and staged settings were used to teach supervisors 
how to deal with specific problems with employees includ- 
ing: reinforcing safe behavior, correcting an employee, 
overcoming resistance to change, handling an irate employ- 
ee, and creating a cooperative workteam. 

The training intervention reported by Peters (24) 
entailed (a) conducting 8 h of training for subordinate 
managers and supervisors in loss-control fundamentals; 

(b) providing 8 h of training to supervisors and workers 
selected by the top manager in the use of an accident 
investigation methodology developed by the Bureau; and 

(c) furnishing available materials for training mobile 
equipment operators and assisting in task training course 
development. 

The training intervention reported by Uslan (30) was 
called positive motivational safety training (POMOST). 
This training provides supervisors with "an understanding 
about behavior and a process by which they can improve 
performance; increase safe work behaviors, help the 
employee feel better about himself, the company, and his 
job; and generally establish a work environment which is 
positively supportive." The principal reinforcer used 
in POMOST is praise, i.e., positive verbal feedback. 
POMOST instructs trainees how and when to praise their 
employees. The program was taught in 22 to 40 h, de- 
pending on need. The program objectives were as follows: 



How to recognize unsafe behaviors. 

How to develop behavior baselines. 

How to determine what behaviors to change. 

How to communicate behavior change to employees. 

How to shape behaviors. 

How to maintain a safe work behavior program. 

This training discourages the use of punishment. 
Rather, emphasis is placed on the first line supervisor 
focusing the employees' attention on the appropriateness 
of their behavior. The existence of inappropriate behavior 
is not ignored, but perceived as a training problem. 

Approximately 100 managers and supervisors from four 
plants were trained in the use of positive reinforcement for 
occurrences of safe behavior. Each supervisor was also 
provided manuals and other supportive materials. Addi- 
tionally, following training, all supervisors were provided 
some coaching experience to keep the knowledge and 
capabilities gained during training from being lost. 

Management Planning 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results suggest that in 
comparison with low-accident rate mines, there was a 
greater tendency for management to put off making impor- 
tant decisions and more worktime was lost through poor 
scheduling and planning at high-accident mines. 

Management Commitment to Safety 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire data suggest that in compar- 
ison with miners in high-accident mines, miners in low- 
accident mines felt that keeping good safety records and 
upholding the company safety record were significantly 
more important to their companies. 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results suggest that man- 
agement at high-accident rate mines provided less support 
for decisions made by section supervisors concerning safety 
than did management at low-accident rate mines. 

DeMichiei (9) makes the following observations regard- 
ing information provided to him through interviews with 
mine managers and safety officials: (a) in five high-acci- 
dent rate mines, the mine superintendents had no direct 
involvement in the mine's safety and health program; 
(b) responsibility for implementing the program was 
mainly the safety department's; and (c) safety department 
personnel at these five high-rate mines identified the lack 
of upper management involvement in safety matters as a 
serious impediment to improving safety and health condi- 
tions at the mine. 



Production Competition Between Crews 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest that in com- 
parison with miners in high-accident mines, miners in low- 
accident mines felt that having competition among work- 
crews was significantly less important to their companies. 

Production Pressure 

Pfeifer's (25) study suggests that in comparison with 
supervisors in high-accident mines, supervisors in low- 
accident mines are significantly less inclined to push hard 
for production or to cut corners on safety. 

Sanders' (27) findings, based on a cross-lagged panel 
design, suggest that a causal relationship exists between 
increased levels of production pressure and increases in 
the rate of lost-time injuries. Sanders states, "Production 
pressure appears to lead to an increase in disabling injuries 
which in turn results in a decrease in production pressure." 

Equipment Availability 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire study suggests that 
miners in low-accident rate mines are better provided with 
supplies, equipment, and the tools necessary for job ac- 
complishment than are miners at high-accident rate mines. 

Safety and Health Equipment Maintenance 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results indicate that miners 
in low-accident rate mines cite poor maintenance of health 
and safety equipment as being an important reason for 
not using it significantly more often than miners in high- 
accident rate mines. 

Safety-Production Incentive Program 

Although the specific terms of combined safety-produc- 
tion incentive plans vary, they all have the same basic 
structure. These plans pay out some form of bonus for 
production above a specified target, provided the number 
of accidents does not exceed some specified maximum 
number. If more than the maximum number of accidents 
occur, then bonuses are not paid for exceeding the pro- 
duction target, or the amount of the bonus is reduced 
according to some predetermined formula. 

Gaertner (14) compared coal companies using a com- 
bined safety-production incentive program with companies 
not using such a program. He found that the average rate 
of lost-time injuries was lower for the companies that were 
using the combined safety-production incentive program. 
Likewise, Page (22) performed a case study of the char- 
acteristics common to high producing underground coal 
mines and found that 18 out of 25 of them had some form 
of combined safety-production incentive program. 

Gaertner (14) also compared coal companies using an 
incentive program based on safety performance alone with 
companies that had no type of incentive program, and 



found that the average rate of injuries was essentially the 
same for the two groups of companies. Likewise, Good- 
man (17) found that the rate of accidents was NOT sig- 
nificantly affected by the introduction of a safety incentive 
program at any of the four different coal mines included 
in the study. 

The reasons for the observed difference in safety 
performance between companies using combined safety- 
production incentive programs versus those using an incen- 
tive program based on safety performance alone are not 
entirely clear. Gaertner offers the following speculation 
concerning his results: 

Safety incentives not tied to production tended to 
be relatively inexpensive and symbolic (T-shirts, caps, 
decals) and generally did not indicate a serious com- 
mitment by management to safety in the eyes of the 
foremen and hourly employees. Rather they were 
usually intended as "reminders to the men, to keep 
thinking about safety," as one manager put it. Com- 
bined production-safety incentives seem more effec- 
tive, and generally more costly. In one company, the 
cost of the production-safety incentives was 25 cents 
per ton; in another it was 81 cents per ton. As one 
foreman put it, the incentive program in place in his 
company "made management put their money where 
their mouth was." 

Safety Disciplinary Actions 

Some coal companies have (and use) disciplinary 
actions applied to safety violations by miners and super- 
visors. Gaertner (14) compared companies using such a 
policy with companies not using such a policy, and found 
that the rate of injuries was lower at companies that used 
a safety discipline policy. 

In Braithwaite's (5) case study of the five major coal 
companies with the best safety records during the early 
1980's, he notes that there was considerable variation in 
their use of punitive actions for violation of safety policies. 
Two of the five companies used punitive measures much 
more often than the other three. 

Size of Mine 

The National Academy of Sciences (21) analyzed 
MSHA's data concerning all lost time injuries that occur- 
red in U.S. underground coal mines during the 3-yr period 
1978 through 1980; such injuries numbered nearly 40,000, 
including fatalities. One of the variables, which emerged 
as highly correlated with rate of fatalities, was mine size. 
It was found that the fatality rate for mines with 50 or 
fewer employees (0.14) was about three times that of 
mines with over 250 employees (0.05), and almost twice 
that of mines with 51-250 employees. Small mines (< 50) 
accounted for 15 pet of total employee-hours, but 40 pet of 
all fatalities. 



Feedback and Praise 

Rhoton (26) was successful in virtually eliminating 
MSHA ventilation violation notices at a coal mine that, 
prior to the intervention, had been experiencing an average 
of 2.6 such violations per month. The intervention was 
conducted by the company's safety inspector, and consisted 
of: praising face crews and their supervisors for being in 
compliance with the target behaviors; posting graphic 
feedback charts of the ventilation violation notices in the 
mine office; delivering verbal feedback at biweekly safety 
meetings with the supervisors; and when a section was 
found to be noncompliant, the company safety inspector 
would stop coal production until the hazardous condition 
was corrected. Each section was observed once per week 
on a random basis. 

Night Shift Work 

Research by Andlauer (2) suggests that workers per- 
forming routine tasks during periods of low alertness and 
arousal will lend to introduce few errors into these tasks. 
However, the inhibited state of psychological arousal 
coupled with a narrow conscious focus on the routine task 
at hand may not allow the employee to respond properly 
to emergencies, thereby promoting the causation of rela- 
tively severe accidents. 

Wagner (31) examined this issue by comparing the 
average severity of night shift accidents that involved the 
operation of heavy mining equipment versus accidents 
involving miners performing other types of activities— ones 
that presumably require less vigilance to perform the job 
safely. The data for this study consisted of accidents 
reported to MSHA from 10 surface iron ore operations 
over a 10-yr period. These mines all worked an identical 
shift rotation schedule for that full 10-yr period. 

Accidents were broken down according to the shift (day, 
afternoon, night) and according to whether the accident 
occurred during equipment operation (selected accidents) 
or during the course of performing some other type of 
activity (nonselected accidents). The average number of 
days lost per accident was used as the measure of accident 
severity. 

Wagner (31) found that the average length of time to 
recover from mobile equipment accidents was significantly 
greater for accidents experienced during the night shift 
than for accidents experienced during the day or afternoon 
shifts. Among nonselected accidents, night shift accidents 
are also more severe, but by a much smaller margin com- 
pared with the other two shifts. These data appear to 
confirm findings by Andlauer (2) and others regarding 
automatic behavior and employees' inability to respond 
adequately in emergency situations during times such as 
the night shift when vigilance is difficult to maintain. 

EMPLOYEE CONTROL 

Three variables have been studied that concern the ex- 
tent to which employees have the opportunity to influence 



what happens to them on the job: (1) worker participation 
in problem solving, (2) worker autonomy, and (3) decen- 
tralized decision making. Although the meaning of worker 
participation in problem solving is rather self-evident, the 
latter two variables may not be as easily understood. 
Definitions of autonomy include: the amount of control 
employees have over what happens on the job; the extent 
to which employees see themselves as free to do what they 
want in accomplishing their work; perceived self-determi- 
nation (13). One way of increasing perceived autonomy 
is by increasing employees' opportunity to influence de- 
cisions that affect them. 

Although the notion of decentralization can be applied 
to hourly employees, it is more typically used to character- 
ize decision making at higher levels in the organization. 
Webber (32) refers to decentralization as the extent to 
which higher executives delegate authority to make deci- 
sions to subordinate managers. 

Worker Participation In Problem Solving 

Bell (3) reports that injury rates at an underground 
silver mine were significantly lower following the institu- 
tion of an organization development effort. A primary 
feature of this intervention was the formation of problem 
solving teams. A series of meetings took place in which 
high-priority issues facing the team were systematically 
examined and resolved. These meetings usually were con- 
ducted with the aid of a consultant who acted as a facil- 
itator. Problems were defined and clarified, alternative 
solutions were evaluated, preferred solutions were imple- 
mented, and the effects of actions were monitored for 
desired results. Team-building meetings began at the top 
of the organization, involving the president and those 
reporting to the president. During the last phase of the 
project, team-building meetings were held with shift bosses 
and their workcrews. 

Similarly, Edwards (10) reports that the introduction 
of quality circles at a large surface coal mining operation 
brought about a significant reduction in the accident rate. 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results (based on the 
responses of mine managers and safety officials) suggest 
that good ideas fostered by miners get more serious con- 
sideration from management at low-accident rate mines 
than at high-accident rate mines. 

DeMichiei (9) makes the following three observations 
based on interviews with miners: 

(1) At low-accident rate mines, miners indicated that 
individuals in key management positions were receptive 
and responsive to miner requests and frequently solicited 
input from the miners concerning mine policies and 
procedures. 

(2) At several low-accident rate mines, miners indi- 
cated that management earnestly encouraged interaction 
between themselves and labor representatives. Manage- 
ment at most of the low-accident rate mines recognized 
the importance of labor safety and health committees and 



actively sought out their participation in resolving safety 
and health problems. 

(3) Miners at several high-accident rate mines be- 
lieved management to be one-sided since they had little 
input into the decision making process. 

Worker Autonomy 

The results of the autonomous workgroups experiment 
at Rushton Mining Co., Osceola Mills, PA, suggests that 
increasing miners' autonomy may have been responsible 
for the improvements that were observed in mine safety. 
Although this intervention entailed making a number of 
changes to the organization, one of the most notable 
changes was the creation of self-managing coal mine face 
crews. These crews were given the entire responsibility 
for making all the decisions pertaining to the day-to-day 
production of coal from their sections. Crew supervisors 
were no longer involved in making production decisions. 
Their primary responsibility was to maintain the safety of 
the crew. 

It is actually very difficult to determine what role 
autonomy played in producing the safety improvements. 
Goodman (16) notes that any of the following changes 
could have been responsible for the safety improvements: 

(1) The experimental group received more formal 
training about safety practices and the law. 

(2) The experiment introduced a new reward system 
to motivate the workers toward good safety practices. 
Intrinsic rewards were increased: The workgroup had 
been restructured to provide the workers greater opportu- 
nities for feelings of responsibility and accomplishment if 
safety levels improved. Extrinsic rewards were also in- 
creased through formal feedback sessions for the workers 
concerning their performance on such activities as safety. 

(3) The supervisors in the experimental section were 
no longer caught in the conflict between production and 
safety. They could expend all their energies on safety. 
Supervisors in the nonexperimental sections had continu- 
ally to balance production and safety demands. 

Sanders' (27) findings, based on a cross-lagged panel 
design, suggests that a causal relationship exists between 
greater decentralization of decision making (down to the 
miners' level) and a lowering of the rate of lost-time 
injuries. He states, "mines in which miners are given 
decision responsibility and autonomy tend to have a lower 
incidence of injuries than other mines." 

Decentralized Decision Making 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results (based on the 
responses of mine managers and safety officials) suggest 
that section supervisors at high-accident rate mines did not 
have as much freedom to make decisions concerning 



health, safety, and production as did section supervisors at 
low-accident rate mines. 

Braithwaite's (5) case study of five coal companies with 
outstanding safety records suggests that decentralization of 
decisions regarding safety is a characteristic that is com- 
mon among the large mining companies with better safety 
records. 

These results concerning a positive association between 
decentralized decision making and mine safety do not 
contradict those discussed earlier concerning the value of 
upper management's interest and commitment to ensuring 
their miners' safety. As Gaertner (14) points out, upper 
management can express this commitment through setting 
safety-oriented policies and showing support for those 
charged with the responsibility for seeing to it that safety 
policies are being implemented and adhered to, as well as 
by frequently reviewing safety performance and generally 
keeping abreast of what is being done to maintain and 
improve safety. However, this does not mean that upper 
management should be running the show. Braithwaite 
notes that in mining companies with better safety records, 
upper management tends to delegate the responsibility for 
implementation and adherence to safety policies to line 
management. The fact that upper management delegates 
this function does not mean that they are not keeping a 
close watch on safety performance or that they are dis- 
interested in employee safety. 

MANAGEMENT-LABOR RELATIONS 

This category includes the variables: overall labor rela- 
tions climate, management concern for labor, and labor 
support for safety disciplinary actions. A considerable 
amount of evidence is accumulating to suggest that there 
is a significant positive association between the favorable- 
ness of the management-labor relationship and mine 
safety. Part of this association reflects the tendency for 
good labor relations to result in a safer environment and 
better employee compliance with safety rules. However, 
part of this association may reflect the tendency for 
changes in safety to produce changes in management-labor 
relations. For instance, a deterioration in safety could tend 
to cause a deterioration in management-labor relations. 
No doubt there is a reciprocal relationship between these 
two factors. Given the type of research evidence available, 
it is not possible to specify the predominant direction of 
causality. Nevertheless, the fact that a consistent positive 
association between these two factors has been identified 
is worth noting and has important implications for the 
achievement of a safer mining industry. 

Overall Labor Relations Climate 

Gaertner's (14) analysis of factors correlated to coal 
companies' safety performance indicates that the injury 
rate in companies with a negative labor relations climate 
is almost double that of the rate in companies with a 
positive climate. He also compared the two groups of 
companies in terms of the average annual rate of MSHA 



citations per mine for significant and substantial safety 
violations. Gaertner found that the rate for companies 
with positive labor relations was only about a third as high 
as the rate for companies in which the labor relations 
climate was relatively negative. 

As part of the National Academy of Sciences (21) study, 
interviews were conducted with miners and mine managers 
at twelve large underground coal mines (150 workers or 
more). These mines were selected partially because they 
represented the extremes of safety performance, i.e., seven 
had quite low injury rates and five had quite high injury 
rates. The researchers note the following concerning the 
labor relations climate at these two groups of mines: "at 
all seven mines with low injury rates there appeared to be 
a cooperative attitude between management and labor; an 
adversarial attitude was observed in three of the five mines 
with high injury rates." 

Both Gaertner (14) and the National Academy of 
Sciences (21) researchers point out that managers at mines 
with favorable labor relations usually had an open door 
policy, i.e., they were more accessible to hourly employees. 

Management Concern for Labor 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results suggest that 
management at high-accident rate mines is less interested 
in the welfare of workers both on and off the job than 
management at low-accident rate mines. These results are 
based on the perceptions of salaried employees (includes 
mine superintendents, section supervisors, and mine safety 
department personnel). 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest that super- 
visors in low-accident rate mines "more often show real 
concern for workers' welfare." These results are based on 
the perceptions of underground hourly employees. 

Labor Support for Safety Discipline 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results suggest that sec- 
tion supervisors in low-accident rate mines received more 
support from safety committeepersons when reprimanding 
miners for unsafe acts. Based on interview data with 
miners he states, 

A significant finding at 11 high-accident rate mines 
was statements made by safety and health commit- 
tees concerning their reluctance to support manage- 
ment's decision to reprimand miners for unsafe acts, 
even though such actions were justified. They stated 
that if such support was given to management, the 
rank and file miners usually reacted in a hostile man- 
ner. Management believed that such reaction by 
labor representatives prevented a good faith effort on 
the part of both parties to promote health and safety 
at the mines. 

This same issue was examined in the part of the 
National Academy of Sciences (21) study that compared 



underground coal mines with either very low- or very high- 
accident rates. The researchers note that at all of the 
seven low-injury rate mines the union generally supported 
the company's enforcement of safety rules. 

SUPERVISOR-EMPLOYEE INTERACTION 

The miners' immediate supervisor has a great deal of 
impact on the extent to which safe working conditions 
exist and the extent to which miners comply with safety 
regulations. Variables dealing with the supervisor-employ- 
ee relationship that have been addressed by mining 
industry safety researchers include: reporting hazards to 
supervisor, employee development, praise for working 
safely, and communications to miners. No doubt many of 
the variables listed in the other categories are also heavily 
influenced by the immediate supervisors' behavior, e.g., 
management-labor relations and role conflict. 

Reporting Hazards to Supervisor 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest that miners 
in low-accident rate mines reported small accidents and 
safety and health hazards to the supervisor more often 
than miners in high-accident rate mines. Similarly, 
DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results suggest that miners 
contacted section supervisors regarding unsafe conditions 
more often at low-accident rate mines than at high- 
accident rate mines. 

Employee Development 

Sanders' (27) questionnaire results suggest that super- 
visors at mines with low-accident rates did more to 
instruct, guide, coach, and develop their employees' talents 
and abilities than supervisors at mines with high-accident 
rates. 

Praise for Working Safely 

Although the intervention involved several other 
changes, one of the primary things Uslan (30) taught the 
supervisors of salt mine employees to do was to system- 
atically praise their employees for working safely. A 
significant reduction in the rate of eye, head, hand, and 
back injuries took place following the intervention. 

Similarly, Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest 
that in comparison with high-accident rate mines, super- 
visors in low-accident rate mines were more likely to give 
miners a pat on the back when they followed safety 
procedures. 

Communications to Miners 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results suggest that there 
is more conflict or misunderstanding over directions and 
job assignments given at high-accident rate mines. 



10 



INDIVIDUAL MINER 

Each of the variables in this category characterize a 
single person or a single person's workrole. Variables in 
this category that have been addressed by safety research- 
ers in the mining industry include: absenteeism, coworker 
relations, role ambiguity, role overload, role conflict, and 
age. No doubt the three variables concerning the individ- 
ual's role are also heavily influenced by the immediate 
supervisor and by some of the variables listed under the 
organizational category, e.g., training, feedback, and man- 
agement planning. 

Absenteeism 

Goodman (18) examined the effects or consequences of 
absenteeism on accidents. His central premise is that lack 
of familiarity leads to more dangerous conditions that, in 
the absence of compensatory changes in the level of care 
taken by a miner, would contribute to higher rates of 
accidents. Unfamiliarity can affect three types of people 
in coal mining: 1) miners who have just returned to the 
mine after being absent, 2) miners assigned as a replace- 
ment for a miner who is absent, and 3) adjacent miners. 
In a typical crew configuration, most mining activities 
require coordination among pairs of individuals who work 
closely together: the miner operator and the helper, the 
roof bolter and the helper, and the two shuttle car opera- 
tors. Considering such dyads, the worker adjacent to the 
replacement may also be placed in a more dangerous situ- 
ation because of lack of familiarity with the replacement's 
mining practices, and resulting difficulties in coordinating 
activities in an inherently dangerous environment. Hence, 
this adjacent worker or partner of a replacement is ex- 
pected to have a higher probability of having an accident. 

A data set was created that kept daily records on 
absences, replacement policies, and accidents. Information 
from five mines on these variables was obtained during 
approximately 70,000 miner days worked. This corre- 
sponds to roughly 60 production crews observed for an 
entire year. Using multiple regression analyses, accident 
rates were computed and comparisons made between each 
of the following 11 dyad-familiarity categories: 

A Two regulars, neither absent previous day. 

B Two regulars, one absent previous day. 

C Two regulars, both absent previous day. 

D Two replacements, neither absent previous day. 

E Two replacements, one absent previous day. 

F Two replacements, both absent previous day. 

G One regular, one replacement, neither absent pre- 
vious day. 



H Regular absent previous day, replacement present 
previous day. 

I Regular present previous day, replacement absent 
previous day. 

J One regular, one replacement, both absent pre- 
vious day. 

K One miner working without partner. 

Goodman (18) found that in comparison with category 
F, the accident rates for categories A, C, and D were each 
significantly lower. Most of the other expected differences 
between pairs of accident rates were in the expected direc- 
tion, but were relatively small in magnitude. Goodman 
concludes that prior day absences have the effect of in- 
creasing accidents, and that regular miners have lower 
accident rates than replacement miners. 

DeMichiei's (9) questionnaire results suggest that 
absenteeism is much more of a problem at high-accident 
rate mines than at low-accident rate mines. 

Absenteeism was one of the issues examined in the 
part of the National Academy of Sciences (21) study that 
compared underground coal mines with either very low- or 
very high-accident rates. The researchers note that the 
five mines with high-injury rates tended to have consider- 
ably higher absenteeism rates. 

The responses miners and supervisors gave in Pfeifer's 
(25) questionnaire study of the differences between high- 
and low-accident rate mines suggest that miners in low- 
accident mines had to take care of absentees' jobs signif- 
icantly less often than miners in high-accident mines. 

Coworker Relations 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest that in com- 
parison with the high-accident mines, miners in low-acci- 
dent mines are more apt to believe that miners get along 
with each other and that they can depend on each other. 

On the basis of interviews with miners, DeMichiei (9) 
reports that in comparison with low-accident mines, more 
miners at high-rate mines indicated that they were trou- 
bled by some of their coworkers' behavior. These com- 
plaints were centered around "freeloaders who often took 
advantage of disability compensation, individuals who 
failed to pull their share of the workload and persons who 
abused absentee policies for personal gain." 4 



4 DeMichiei did not perform statistical tests on differences between 
the interview responses of various personnel from high- versus low- 
accident mines. Therefore, such differences are not included in ta- 
ble 2. DeMichiei did perform statistical tests on differences between 
the questionnaire responses of various personnel from high- versus low- 
accident mines, and those differences found significant (p < .05) are 
listed in table 2. 



11 



Role Ambiguity 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest that in 
comparison with the low-accident mines, miners in high- 
accident mines spend more time working without clear-cut 
duties. 

Althouse's (1) findings suggest just the opposite. He 
collected data concerning the extent to which coal miners 
experience 30 separate dimensions of job stress from the 
same sample of mines that Pfeifer (25) studied. Very little 
evidence of any differences in the self-reported levels of 
stress experienced by miners employed at high- versus low- 
accident rate mines was found. However, contrary to the 
hypothesis-that miners at high-accident rate mines would 
report higher levels of perceived role ambiguity than 
miners at low-accident rate mines- Althouse (1) found just 
the opposite. The low accident, rather than the high- 
accident sample reported significantly higher levels of role 
ambiguity. In other words, miners in low-accident mines 
were more likely to report that the clarity of responsibility 
and certainty of objectives on their jobs was ill-defined. 
Obviously, more research evidence is needed in order to 
form any conclusions about the relationship between 
miners' role ambiguity and safety. 

Role Overload 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest that in 
comparison with the high-accident mines, significantly 
fewer miners at low-accident mines report that they are 
expected to do too many things in too little time. 

Role Conflict 

Pfeifer's (25) questionnaire results suggest that in 
comparison with the high-accident mines, significantly 
fewer managers in low-accident mines felt that miners had 
to answer to more than one person. 

One of the variables considered in Sanders' (27) cross- 
lag panel study of mine safety was miners' ratings of the 
consistency of the orders they were being given. Sanders 
(27) found that increases in the lost-time injury rate 
tended to bring about increases in the rated consistency of 
orders, which then appeared to decrease the lost-time 
injury rate (p < .10). 

These findings concerning miners' perceptions of role 
ambiguity, overload, and conflict may all be indications of 
insufficient management planning at the high-accident rate 
mines. 

Age 

The National Academy of Sciences (21) study looked at 
the relationship between age and various accident rates for 
15 of the largest underground coal producing companies in 
the United States. These companies provided data to the 



researchers concerning the age of their work force, and the 
accident data came from the reports these companies filed 
with MSHA concerning lost-time injuries that occurred in 
their mines during the 3-yr period 1978 through 1980. The 
researchers found that there is no evidence of an age trend 
with respect to fatality rates or permanent disability injury 
rates. However, there is a very marked correlation be- 
tween age and lost-time injury rates. Miners between the 
ages of 18 and 24 have a lost-time injury rate nearly twice 
that of miners 25 to 34, who have a rate about 25 pet 
higher than miners 35 to 44, who in turn have a rate over 
40 pet higher than miners who are at least 45 yr of age. 
Hence, a young miner (18-24) is about three times more 
likely to be injured than is a miner 45 yr of age or older, 
about twice as likely to be injured than is a miner 25-44. 
This relationship is consistent across the 15 companies 
that provided data on the age of their work force, as well 
as for each of the years 1978, 1979, and 1980. Further- 
more, the strong association between age and lost-time 
injury rate was apparent for each of the major categories 
of accident types that cause injuries. 

Findings of nonsignificant relationships to mine safety. 
Many examples of nonsignificant relationships between 
mine safety and various organizational and behavioral 
variables have been reported. Because these variables are 
so numerous, they will not all be listed. The interested 
reader should examine the results of the analyses of 
responses to questionnaire items reported in the large 
survey studies conducted by DeMichiei (9), Pfeifer (25), 
and Sanders (27). 

Two variables have been examined in a relatively 
thorough manner and very little evidence was found to 
suggest that they are related to differences in mine safety 
performance: (1) Althouse (1) found that self-reported 
levels of job stress and psychological strain were NOT 
significantly different for miners at 14 high- versus 14 low- 
accident rate coal mines. (2) Goodman (17) found that 
the rate of accidents was NOT significantly affected by the 
introduction of a safety incentive program at four different 
coal mines. Likewise, Gaertner (14) found that there was 
essentially no difference between the injury rate for com- 
panies using versus not using a safety incentive program. 
It may be that safety incentive programs need to be de- 
signed differently than those examined by Goodman (17) 
and Gaertner (14) in order to have a significant impact on 
miners' injury rates. Goodman suggests several ways that 
the plan studied could have been made more effective. It 
may be well worth having a safety incentive program even 
if it does not by itself cause statistically significant reduc- 
tions in the injury rate. Safety incentive programs repre- 
sent one of several mechanisms that management could 
use to communicate their concern for employees' welfare 
and the fact that they want their employees to focus on 
working safely. For a discussion of mine operators' views 
on safety incentive programs see Miles (19). 



12 



OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 



Given the nature of the experimental designs and the 
data collection methods used to conduct most of the 
research presented in this review, there are some serious 
limitations to what can be safely concluded from any one 
study about how an organizational or behavioral factor 
influences mine safety. In most of these studies several 
alternative explanations exist for the observed correlations 
or for the observed changes in safety performance. Future 
studies of mine safety should seek to use longitudinal 
designs, control groups, and multivariate analyses. Two 
significant limitations to performing the types of research 
that would yield the most convincing results are (1) the 
length of time allowed for completing research projects is 
typically insufficient to permit analyses to be performed 
that are based on a longitudinal experimental design, and 
(2) it is difficult to find companies that are willing to 
participate in the research, especially if the research will 
require extensive data collection or entails significant 
changes to well-established practices. 

Another limitation of the current set of research find- 
ings concerns the extent to which these findings can be 
generalized to all segments of the mining industry. The 
bulk of the research has been conducted at large under- 
ground coal mines and large coal mining companies. 
Therefore, it may be inappropriate to assume that these 
results would also be true of smaller mining operations, 
surface mining operations, or noncoal mining operations. 
The best management practices for achieving a good safety 
record at large mining operations may not be feasible or 
practical for relatively small mines. Conversely, the best 
management practices for achieving a good safety record 



at small mining operations may not be practical for rela- 
tively large operations. Future research should be per- 
formed to discover why the fatality rate is so much higher 
at small operations, and to discover what accounts for 
differences between small mine operations that have, 
versus those that have not been successful at maintaining 
a good safety record. 

Certain variables are emerging as statistically significant 
correlates of mine safety in multiple studies involving dif- 
ferent samples of miners and different research methods. 
For instance, it appears that better labor-management 
relations, greater employee involvement in decision mak- 
ing, and lower absenteeism all exert a positive influence 
on mine safety. Several aspects of first line supervisors' 
interactions with miners also appear to be important, as 
well as management's ability to communicate to the miner 
that they truly consider the employees' safety and welfare 
as a top priority. Undoubtedly, a clearer picture of the 
factors important for achieving good safety performance 
will emerge as more research evidence accumulates. 

Another reason that these research findings are note- 
worthy is that most of the variables which appear to be 
playing a significant role in achieving a good mine safety 
record are within management's ability to control. The 
next section of this report lists some of the recommenda- 
tions that the authors of these studies have made con- 
cerning strategies for improving mine safety. One should 
bear in mind that these recommendations are based on 
research findings that are subject to the above mentioned 
limitations. 



RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING MINE SAFETY 



Many of the articles and reports cited in this review list 
specific recommendations for mine operators and other 
mining officials concerning the achievement of a good 
safety record. These recommendations mostly fall into one 
of the following nine categories: safety programs and their 
directors, labor-management interaction, industry com- 
mitment, top management commitment, training, employee 
motivation and/or incentives, supervisor-employee inter- 
actions, management planning, and absenteeism. The 
recommendations made concerning each of these topics 
are listed below. They vary widely in terms of the speci- 
ficity of recommended action. 

1. Safety programs and their directors 

DeMichiei (9): 

• Management must establish a formal safety and health 
program, effectively communicate that program to employ- 
ees and seek labor's active participation in a joint imple- 
mentation of the program. 



• Management should commit the funds and peoplepower 
necessary to establish a safety department and give its 
personnel the authority to implement the safety and health 
program effectively. 

Pfeifer (25): 

• Safety directors' jobs should be redesigned to provide 
for more time in developing company safety programs. 

• Safety directors should be given more authority in the 
area of safety. 

2. Labor-management interaction 

DeMichiei (9): 

• Management and labor must establish open lines of 
communication so that problems affecting health and 
safety can be freely discussed and mutually resolved. 
Open lines of communication must exist between all levels 



13 



of management and labor so that unsafe conditions or 
practices can be corrected and employees can feel free to 
discuss safety issues without fear of adverse action. 

• Management and labor must both recognize that safety 
and health is a joint responsibility, which will only be 
achieved through cooperative efforts. Management and 
labor representatives must take the lead in cultivating a 
cooperative atmosphere at the mine via joint informational 
meetings, safety inspections of workplaces, and increased 
interaction with the general work force. 

• Management should actively involve representatives of 
labor on issues concerning safety, health, and production. 

• Labor representatives must support mine management 
when it is necessary to reprimand miners for unsafe acts. 

• Labor representatives must instill a sense of responsi- 
bility and accountability in the work force for their actions 
and resultant impact those actions may have on fellow 
workers. 

• Management should solicit the assistance of labor in 
identifying and correcting unsafe conditions and practices. 
Conversely, labor should accept the joint responsibility in 
this endeavor. 

• Management should periodically review and solicit the 
opinions of miners concerning established mine policies 
and procedures to determine their effect on the miners' 
morale. 

National Academy of Sciences (21): 

• There is a need to establish joint labor-management 
safety committees at each mine. 

Pfeifer (25): 

• Miners need to be able to better communicate to man- 
agement problems affecting their health and safety. 

• Miners should be given a hand in the establishment 
of new company safety procedures, or, at a minimum, 
the reasons for new safety procedures should be better 
explained to miners. 

3. Industry commitment 

National Academy of Sciences (21): 

• Encourage industry leaders to reinforce the value and 
importance of safety. 

. . . saving lives and minimizing injuries are deeply 
held social values. However, it may be necessary for 
industry leaders to remind their peers that safety is 
as important a value to uphold as is producing coal 
at the lowest cost per ton. 



• Encourage publication of annual rankings of companies 
by their injury rates. 

• Publicize the evidence that productivity and safety can 
be positively related. 

The common denominator in achieving both a good 
safety record and high productivity is competent man- 
agement. A management that can plan well to increase 
production can also plan well to improve safety. More- 
over, a management that shows concern about safety 
signals to its employees that it is concerned about their 
well-being, and, thus, deserves their contributions of 
skill and energy in improving productivity. Finally, a 
management that is willing to listen to employees' ideas 
for improving safety (which the researchers found 
associated with effective programs) is also likely to 
listen to employees' ideas for improving productivity. 

4. Top management commitment 
Pfeifer (25): 

• Coal companies need to formalize safety as an organi- 
zational goal. 

• Coal companies should communicate to workers both 
verbally and through the behavior of management the 
importance of safety as an organizational goal. 

• Coal companies need to place more emphasis on keep- 
ing good safety records and upholding the company safety 
record. 

5. Training 
DeMichiei (9): 

• When formulating new training programs or revising 
existing programs, greater input should be solicited from 
labor by mine management. A thorough review by mine 
management, labor, and MSHA of existing training pro- 
grams will ensure that such plans are tailored to individual 
mine needs. 

• First line supervisors should be provided instruction 
and sufficient time for administering task training to 
subordinates. 

• The means to measure the effects of both classroom 
and on-the-job training should be incorporated into train- 
ing programs. 

National Academy of Sciences (21): 

• A major upgrading of the educational and training 
requirements that new and experienced miners, and also 
supervisors, must meet is needed. 



14 



Pfeifer (25): 

• In addition to better training for miners, better training 
is needed for mine management beginning at the level of 
supervisor. Supervisors must be made aware that they 
serve as models for the miners working under them, and, 
consequently, they must follow all safety procedures. 

Sanders (27): 

• Training mine management in basic supervisory em- 
ployee relations and planning skills would significantly 
impact on the injury rates of the mines. 

6. Employee motivation and/or incentives 
Pfeifer (25): 

• Miners' jobs need to be redesigned in order to provide 
for satisfaction of miners' intrinsic needs such as recogni- 
tion, responsibility, and variety of job tasks, and, so that 
they do not have to do many things at the same time, they 
do not have to work without clear-cut duties, and they do 
not have to answer to more than one person. 

• Programs providing positive reinforcement for a variety 
of identifiable safe job behaviors need to be established for 
both underground miners and supervisors. Techniques, 
which should be used in providing incentives for safe job 
behavior, include making safety an integral part of worker 
performance evaluation and publicizing outstanding safety 
performance. 

• Care must be taken in employing competition among 
workcrews to be sure that safety is included in the criteria 
of good job performance. 

Goodman (17): 

Goodman presents a great deal of advice regarding the 
appropriate design of bonus plans for improving under- 
ground coal mine productivity and safety. 

7. Supervisor-employee interactions 
Uslan (30): 

• Supervisors can affect employee motivation to perform 
their jobs safely by: (1) encouraging employees to buy 
into explicit safety performance goals that are consistent 
with organizational objectives, (2) arranging conditions so 
that employees can accomplish goals, (3) determining 
rewards that employees desire and making these rewards 
contingent on high levels of safety performance, and 
(4) ensuring that employees understand the relationship 
between safety performance and the receipt of rewards. 



DeMichiei (9): 

• Management should periodically monitor on-the-job 
work procedures to ensure that labor has the necessary 
experience or qualifications to recognize adverse 
conditions. 

8. Management planning 
DeMichiei (9): 

• Management should formulate, implement, and en- 
force systematic mining cycles and standardized work 
procedures. 

• Management should develop a comprehensive approach 
for mine development that includes activities such as 
materials handling, transportation and installation of 
equipment parts, etc. "Many times such activities are not 
considered as an integral part of the production." 

• Management, labor, and MSHA must ensure that mine 
plans incorporate measures necessary to adequately con- 
trol the physical environment. "Too often management 
continues to implement minimum plan requirements when, 
in fact, additional measures are necessary." 

Pfeifer (25): 

• Coal companies should establish better programs for 
maintenance of equipment. 

9. Absenteeism 
DeMichiei (9): 

• Management should establish and implement an absen- 
tee policy that is firm, but fair, taking into consideration 
extenuating circumstances that could adversely affect mine 
personnel. 

Goodman (i#)-strategies for coping with miner 
absenteeism: 

• Coal mine operators could better cope with absent 
members of underground coal mining crews by increasing 
familiarity among replacements for absent miners. This 
can be accomplished by organizing pools of replacement 
workers, and by giving special on-the-job training to a 
replacement and to the adjacent worker before work 
begins, in order to help familiarize each miner with the 
practices of its partner. Pools of replacement workers 
could be organized by job categories. For example, certain 
replacements would work as miner helpers, others as car 
operators. The pool could be further organized by mine 
sections; i.e., when possible, certain workers would always 



15 



be assigned to certain work areas with which they are 
relatively familiar. 

Goodman (75)-strategies for reducing miner absenteeism: 

• Improve hiring practices through use of better selection 
procedures and realistic job previews. 

• Institute employee assistance programs, health educa- 
tion programs, and selected types of in-house medical 
services. 



• Maintain a record of each employees' daily attendance 
and post it somewhere for employees to see. 

• Train supervisors in what they can do to prevent 
chronic absenteeism. 

• Use positive reinforcement programs. 

• Ensure consistency in the use of progressive disciplinary 
procedures. 



REFERENCES 



1. Althouse, R, and J. Hurrell. An Analysis of Job Stress in Coal 
Mining. NIOSH (DHEW) 77-217, 1977, 145 pp.; NTIS PB 274-796. 

2. Andlauer, P., and B. Metz. Le Travail en Equipes Alternates 
(Work By Rotating Teams). Physiologie du Travail-Ergonomie 
(Physiology of Work-Ergonomics), ed. by J. Sherrer, Masson (Paris), 
1967, pp. 272-281. 

3. Bell, C. The Hecla Story: Organization Development in the 
Hard-Rock Mining Industry. Paper in Human Engineering and 
Human Resources Management in Mining. Proceedings: Bureau of 
Mines Technology Transfer Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, July 7-8, 1987; 
St. Louis, MO, July 15-16, 1987; and San Francisco, CA, July 21-22, 
1987, comp. by staff. BuMines IC 9145, 1987, pp. 138-148. 

4. Bennett, J., and D. Passmore. Probability of Death, Disability, 
and Restricted Work Activity in United States Underground Bituminous 
Coal Mines, 1975-1981. J. Saf. Res., v. 15, No. 2, 1984, pp. 69-76. 

5. Braithwaite, J. To Punish or Persuade: The Enforcement of 
Coal Mine Safety. State Univ. NY Press (Albany), 1985, 206 pp. 

6. Buller, P., and C. Bell. Effects of Team Building and Goal 
Setting on Productivity. A Field Experiment. Acad. Manage. J., v. 29, 
No. 2, 1986, pp. 305-328. 

7. Cohen, A. Factors in Successful Occupational Safety Programs. 
J. Saf. Res., v. 9, No. 4, 1977, pp. 168-178. 

8. DeJoy, D. Attributional Processes and Hazard Control Manage- 
ment in Industry. J. Saf. Res., v. 16, No. 2, 1985, pp. 61-71. 

9. DeMichiei, J., J. Langton, K. Bullock, and T. Wiles. Factors 
Associated With Disabling Injuries in Underground Coal Mines. 
MSHA, June 1982, 72 pp. 

10. Edwards, S. Quality Circles Are Safety Circles. Natl. Saf. News, 
June 1983, pp. 31-35. 

11. Fiedler, F. Structured Management Training in Underground 
Mining-Five Years Later. Paper in Human Engineering and Human 
Resources Management in Mining. Proceedings: Bureau of Mines 
Technology Transfer Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, July 7-8, 1987; St. Louis, 
MO, July 15-16, 1987; and San Francisco, CA, July 21-22, 1987, comp. 
by staff. BuMines IC 9145, 1987, pp. 149-153. 

12. Fiedler, F. E, C. H. Bell, Jr., M. H. Chemers, and D. Patrick. 
The Effectiveness of Organization and Management Training on Safety 
and Productivity in Metal/Non-Metal Underground Mining (contract 
JO387230, Perceptronics, Inc.). BuMines OFR 191-84, 1983, 296 pp.; 
NTIS PB 85-163285. 

13. Filley, A., R House, and S. Kerr. Managerial Process and 
Organizational Behavior. Scott Foresman, 1976, 558 pp. 

14. Gaertner, G. H., P. D. Newman, M. S. Perry, G. P. Fisher, and 
K. Whitehead. Determining the Effects of Management Practices on 
Coal Miners' Safety (contract JO145029, Westat, Inc.). BuMines 
OFR 39-88, 1987, 348 pp.; NTIS PB 88-221445. 

15. Goodman, P. S. Analysis of Miners' Job Attendance Behavior 
and Its Relationship to Miners' Accidents and Injuries-Final Report 
(contract JO328033, Carnegie-Mellon Univ.). BuMines OFR 60-86, 
1985, 278 pp.; NTIS PB 86-216306. 

16. . Assessing Organizational Change: The Rushton Quality 

of Work Experiment. Wiley, 1979, 391 pp. 



17. Goodman, P. S. Determining the Effect of Incentive Programs 
on the Occurrence of Accidents, Injuries, and Productivity-Final Report 
(contract JO145012, Carnegie-Mellon Univ.). BuMines OFR 47-88, 
1987, 143 pp.; NTIS PB 88-234257. 

18. Goodman, P., and S. Garber. Absenteeism and Accidents in a 
Dangerous Environment: Empirical Analysis of Underground Coal 
Mines. J. Appl. Psych., v. 73, No. 1, 1988, pp. 81-86. 

19. Miles, W. Incentive Programs Get Varied Response From Man- 
agement. Natl. Saf. Counc. Min. Newslett., Mar.-Apr., 1986, pp. 1-3. 

20. Mills, T. Altering the Social Structure in Coal Mining: A Case 
Study. Mon. Labor Rev., v. 99, No. 10, 1976, pp. 3-10. 

21. National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. 
Toward Safer Underground Coal Mines. NAS, 1982, 190 pp. 

22. Page, S., J. Volkwein, and F. Kissell. Some Continuous Sections 
Can Cut More Than 1,000 Tons Per Unit. Coal Age, Jan., 1987, 
pp. 51-55. 

23. Peters, R Foreign Literature on Environmental and Personal 
Factors Affecting the Safety and Productivity of Miners: A Topical 
Listing and Annotated Bibliography of Recent Research. BuMines 
OFR 198-83, 1983, 91 pp.; NTIS PB 84-127687. 

24. Peters, R, and L. Schaffer. Field Tests of a Model Health and 
Safety Program for the Mining Industry. BuMines IC 9075, 1986, 36 pp. 

25. Pfeifer, C, J. Stefanski, and C. Grether. Psychological, Behav- 
ioral, and Organizational Factors Affecting Coal Miner Safety and 
Health (DHEW contract HSM 99-72-151). DHEW, 1976, 319 pp.; NTIS 
PB 275 599. 

26. Rhoton, W. A Procedure To Improve Compliance With Coal 
Mine Safety Regulations. J. Organizational Behav. Manage., v. 2, No. 4, 
1980, pp. 243-249. 

27. Sanders, M., T. Patterson, and J. Peay. The Effect of Organi- 
zational Climate and Policy on Coal Mine Safety (contract HO242039, 
U.S. Dep. Navy). BuMines OFR 108-77, 1976, 180 pp.; NTIS PB 267 
781. 

28. Schaffer, L., and D. Atchison. Research To Improve Health 
and Safety Programs in the Mining Industry. Volume II (contract 
HO308076, Woodward Assoc., Inc.). BuMines OFR 6-85, 1983, 197 pp.; 
NTIS PB 85-151017. 

29. Trist, E., G. Susman, and G. Brown. An Experiment in Autono- 
mous Working in an American Underground Coal Mine. Hum. Relat., 
v. 30, No. 3, 1977, pp. 201-236. 

30. Uslan, S., H. Adelman, and R Keller. Testing the Effects of 
Applied Behavioral Analysis and Applied Behavioral Management 
Techniques on the Safe Behaviors of Salt Mine Personnel (contract 
J0166137, Salt Inst.). BuMines OFR 44-80, 1978, 44 pp.; NTIS PB 80- 
171309. 

31. Wagner, J. Time-Of-Day Variations in the Severity of Injuries 
Suffered By Mine Shiftworkers. Paper in Proceedings of the 32nd 
Annual Meeting of the Human Factors Society. Anaheim, CA, 1988, 
11 pp.; available upon request from J. Wagner, BuMines, Minneapolis, 
MN. 

32. Webber, R Management: Basic Elements of Managing Organi- 
zations. Irwin, 1975, 775 pp. 



16 



APPENDIX.-ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 



Althouse, R., and J. Hurrell. An Analysis of Job Stress in 
Coal Mining. NIOSH (DHEW) 77-217, 1977, 145 pp.; 
NTIS PB 274-7%, 

OBJECTIVE 

This research examined how much job stress and 
psychological strain underground coal miners experience, 
and how levels of job stress and strain reported by miners 
who work in mines with high-accident rates compares with 
the stress and strain reported by miners who work at 
mines with low-accident rates. 

METHODS 

The data for this study were collected in conjunction 
with another NIOSH supported study by Pfeifer (25). , x 
The data for the study were based on questionnaire re- 
sponses from a sample of 486 miners and mine supervisors 
employed in nine different States. The sample included 14 
matched pairs of coal mines, with one high-accident mine 
and one low-accident mine in each pair. 

Analyses were conducted to address the hypothesis: 
mines exhibiting high rates of accidents adversely affect 
the experiences and attitudes of their employees compared 
with miners working in lower accident environments. 

Measures of job stress pertain to characteristics of the 
miners' work environment, which pose a threat either as 
demands which they may not be able to meet or as insuffi- 
cient supplies to meet their needs, such as, underutilization 
of abilities, participation, role conflict, inequity in pay, 
social support, and so forth. 

A strain refers to any deviation from normal responses 
in a person. Among the indicators of psychological strain, 
three types of job satisfaction were measured (boredom, 
workload dissatisfaction, and general job dissatisfaction), 
and indices of somatic complaints and affective states 
(anxiety, depression, and irritation) were also included in 
the questionnaire. 

RESULTS 



being used is safe and well maintained, that various proj- 
ects are carried out properly, and that budgets are well 
prepared and are adhered to. 

Among the 30 separate job stresses associated with the 
reported experiences of miners, only three discriminated 
significantly between high and/or low accident under- 
ground miners; namely, fairness at work, role ambiguity, 
and responsibility for things. However, contrary to expec- 
tations, the data show that the low accident, rather than 
the high accident sample was significantly higher on those 
stresses. In other words, miners in low- accident mines 
were the ones who felt that the clarity of responsibility 
and certainty of objectives on their jobs were ill-defined, 
perceived less of a share in the opportunities to use their 
skills, abilities, and ideas, and experienced a significantly 
greater discrepancy between the actual amount of respon- 
sibility for setting projects and controlling the maintenance 
and safety of equipment than what they would have liked 
to have had. 

With regard to psychological strains, the authors also 
found very little difference between the responses of 
miners working at high and/or low accident rates mines. 
The authors state that with one exception, the differences 
revealed were largely trivial ones. The authors suggest 
that the one reported difference (greater amount of 
personal energy off-the-job) probably reflects differences 
in the age of the miners in the two samples, and not the 
mine environments. 

Althouse points out that this study is based on actual 
safety, not miners' perception of safety. This is an impor- 
tant point because the Pfeifer (25) results (based on the 
same sample of miners) indicate that not only did most of 
the miners from ALL the mines sampled actually perceive 
their mines to be safe ones, but that there was no signif- 
icant difference in perception of safety between high 
and/or low accident mine environments among the under- 
ground miners, surface employees, or supervisors. One 
might expect that miners in high-accident mines would 
experience increased stress only if they perceived their 
mine as less safe, but this was not the case. Therefore, 
Althouse concludes: 



Overall, there was surprisingly little difference between 
the high and/or low accident mines in terms of reported 
levels of stress and strain. With regard to job stress, the 
data indicate that there are few differences in job stresses 
between the high and/or low accident mine samples. Only 
one stress measure, Responsibility for Things, differed 
significantly between supervisors. As expected, the super- 
visors in high- accident mines were less satisfied than the 
supervisors in the low-accident mines with the amount of 
responsibility they have for seeing that the equipment 



italic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references 
preceding the appendix. 



until more information is available, some healthy 
skepticism is warranted with respect to manifest, 
objective classification of mines by accident level and 
an easy inference that subjective job stresses are 
coincidental with that classification. 

Althouse also points out that his findings do not neces- 
sarily mean that miners do not experience considerable 
psychological strain in both high-and low-accident mines. 
The researchers compared the reported stress and strain 
of coal miners with other nationally sampled blue-collar 
workers, and found that miners fared better than average 
on most measures of job stress, and, in fact, were low in 
subjective job stress experiences. 



17 



With respect to strain, however, miners were much 
more irritated than other blue-collar employees. They also 
experienced greater than average anxiety, depression, and 
had more physical complaints. However, on the average, 
they expressed higher job satisfaction, lower workload 
dissatisfaction, and less boredom than other blue-collar 
workers. Althouse concludes that miners were higher in 
their affective psychological strain, but lower than the 
average blue-collar worker on behavioral strain indicators. 

Bell, C. The Hecla Story: Organization Development in 
the Hard-Rock Mining Industry. Paper in Human Engi- 
neering and Human Resources Management in Mining. 
Proceedings: Bureau of Mines Technology Transfer 
Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, July 7-8, 1987; St. Louis, MO, 
July 15-16, 1987; and San Francisco, CA, July 21-22, 1987, 
comp. by staff. BuMines IC 9145, 1987, pp. 138-148. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of this study was to determine the effects 
of a team-building and problem-solving organization 
development (OD) intervention on productivity and safety 
at an underground hard-rock mine. 

METHODS 

The OD program was instituted at the Hecla Mining 
Co.'s Lucky Friday Mine. This mine extracts an ore con- 
taining silver, lead, and zinc. It is located in the Coeur 
d'Alene Mining District of Idaho, and employs about 180 
underground workers. Hecla also operates the Star Mine, 
which is located in the same area and employs about 270 
miners. The two mines operate in the same geological 
formation, use essentially identical mining technology, and 
draw from the same labor pool. The Star Mines, which 
received no intervention during the time of the study, 
served as a comparison mine with the Lucky Friday Mine. 

The primary intervention was through team-building 
and problem-solving meetings in which a boss and the 
immediate subordinates identified and resolved major 
problems to make their unit more effective. Some of the 
assumptions that underlie team building are as follows: 
(1) Workteams are the basic building blocks of an organ- 
ization; (2) Effective team functioning requires good 
leader-member relations, clear team goals, clarification of 
role expectations, and individual and group problem- 
solving skills; (3) Teams can improve their performance 
by systematically solving the major problems that con- 
front them; and (4) Enhancing workteam performance 
makes individuals more competent and organizations more 
successful. 

The classic or team-building and problem-solving 
approach introduced at Hecla was governed by several 
principles: 



2. Focus attention on intact workteams consisting of 
superiors and subordinates, 

3. Focus on getting the job done; i.e., find better ways 
to accomplish the team's mission by solving major prob- 
lems and seizing opportunities, 

4. Be data based; i.e., discover problems, opportuni- 
ties, and solutions through fact-finding and diagnostic 
procedures, 

5. Be interaction oriented; i.e., develop and imple- 
ment action plans to cause desired changes. Followup 
and evaluate actions to ensure a general team-building 
and problem-solving framework, but use additional OD 
techniques as they are appropriate. 

The technique of team building involved a series of 
meetings in which high-priority issues facing the team were 
systematically examined and resolved. These meetings 
usually were conducted with the aid of a consultant who 
acted as a facilitator. Problems were defined and clarified, 
alternative solutions were evaluated, preferred solutions 
were implemented, and the effects of actions were moni- 
tored for desired results. Team building had two expected 
outcomes: the team's mission would be better accom- 
plished, and work relationships among team members 
would be improved. 

The effort began with five, day-long, team-building 
meetings with the president and staff. The outcome of 
these meetings was a formal statement of company phi- 
losophy and goals. An agreement on corporate strategy 
related to safety and productivity was developed. A state- 
ment of each department's goals, functions, responsibilities, 
and authority was also drawn up. 

Next, team-building meetings were held with the top- 
management team at the Lucky Friday Mine, as well as 
with the operations team that included the shift bosses. 
After that, meetings were held involving the mine man- 
ager, mine superintendent, mine supervisors, shift bosses, 
and auxiliary support supervisors. These meetings dealt 
more intensively with issues of organizational coordination, 
communication, and cooperation. For example, support 
units were not delivering the needed services; some 
individuals and work units were not meeting others' 
expectations of what they should be accomplishing. The 
outcomes of these meetings were improved methods for 
getting the job done and detailed strategies for reducing 
mine accidents and injuries. 

During the last phase of the project, team-building 
meetings were held with shift bosses and their workcrews. 
The meetings addressed four main questions: 

1. What's preventing the crews from doing the job in 
the way they think it ought to be done? 



1. Start team building and problem solving at the top 
of the organization and work through all levels, 



2. What are the crews doing that helps them get the 
job done? 



18 



3. How can the crews get the job done more safely? 

4. How can the crews make this a better place to 
work? 

Other aspects of the intervention were as follows: a 
new performance appraisal system, a supervisory skills 
training program, and a review and critique of Hecla's 
safety program. The organization's safety functions were 
analyzed in various team-building meetings. These activi- 
ties resulted in specific changes, including: 

1. Reassignment of responsibility for the safety engi- 
neering, and safety inspection and enforcement. 

2. Upgrade the mine safety-person position from 
supervisor to shift boss rank. 

3. Commitment to give safety training to each new 
supervisor. 

4. Commitment to develop a year-long schedule of 
safety incentive programs at the Lucky Friday Mine. 

The effects of the intervention were assessed by com- 
paring productivity and safety before and after the inter- 
vention at the Lucky Friday mine. Data were also col- 
lected on the productivity and safety performance of other 
nearby silver mines including one (the Star Mine) that was 
owned by the same company. These mines served as 
control sites. 

RESULTS-SAFETY 

During 1981, the first year following the intervention, 
Lucky Friday's injury rate fell to 12.9 injuries per 200,000 
employee-hours: almost half of what it had been during 
the preceding 3 yr. This brought Lucky Friday's injury rate 
down to almost exactly the same level as the Star Mine 
and other nearby mines. 

Since 1981, the injury rate increased somewhat in 1982, 
decreased again in 1983, and increased in 1984. But the 
injury rates remained well below rates experienced prior 
to the OD intervention. The average of the injury rates 
for the period from 1981 to 1984 is 38.2 pet below the 
average for the 3 yr prior to the intervention. The injury 
rate for the first 6 months of 1985 is extremely good. 
During this period, the employees at the Lucky Friday 
Mine went 88 working days without a lost-time injury: 
which is an all time record for this mine. 

RESULTS-PRODUCTIVITY 

The annual average tons of ore mined per production 
shift at the Lucky Friday Mine varied between 11 and 12 
short tons per shift during the period from 1979 to 1982. 
Using the pre-intervention years of 1979 and 1980 as a 
basis of comparison, tons per employee-shift was 1.4 pet 
lower in 1981, and 4.5 pet lower in 1982. However, 



beginning in 1983, productivity began to improve. In com- 
parison with the pre-intervention years, tons per employee- 
shift was 18 pet higher in 1983, 37 pet higher in 1984, 
and 54 pet higher during the first half of 1985. The impact 
of the OD program was not immediately reflected in 
improvements in stope miner productivity. Rather, there 
was a delay of over a year before increases began to 
materialize. One explanation for this may be that the 
company and the miners were engaged in a dispute over 
the administration of the contract system in late 1981 and 
1982, with a slow down staged by the miners in 1982. The 
issues were resolved in late 1982 and productivity started 
on a steady rise. 

CONCLUSIONS 

To summarize, it appears that the OD team building 
intervention at Hecla was highly effective at improving 
both safety and productivity. The effects of the inter- 
ventions were not a transient phenomenon. Data were 
collected for about 5 yr after the intervention was begun, 
and it appears that the initial improvements in safety and 
productivity have been maintained. 

Bell estimates that to install an OD program in another 
mine similar to the Lucky Friday would require approxi- 
mately 100 employee days of consulting plus expenses (i.e., 
from $80,000 to $150,000 over a 2 to 3 yr period), as well 
as the time periods which mine managers and miners 
would spend in team-building and problem-solving activi- 
ties (approximately 25 h per person). For further details 
about this intervention, see Fiedler (72) and Buller (6). 

Bennett, J., and D. Passmore. Probability of Death, Dis- 
ability, and Restricted Work Activity in United States 
Underground Bituminous Coal Mines, 1975-1981. J. Saf. 
Res., v. 15, No. 2, 1984, pp. 69-76. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of this study was to examine the correlates 
of injury severity in United States bituminous coal mines. 

METHOD 

Data were obtained from MSHA on all coal mining 
accidents and injuries during the period from 1975 to 1981. 
Data were eliminated from any mine other than an 
underground bituminous coal mine, from injured people 
under 18 and over 65 yr of age, from injuries at surface 
areas of underground mines, and from accidents that did 
not result in injuries. This left data on 82,945 injuries for 
analysis. 

The criterion variable was binary. It was coded 1 if the 
injury resulted in death, permanent total or permanent 
partial disability, days away from work only, days away 
from work combined with days of restricted work activity, 
and days of restricted work activity only. It was coded if 
the injury was so minor that it did not result in one of the 
above situations. 



19 



The variates studied were as follows: mining method, 
miner age, total mining experience, job experience, specific 
mine experience, job classification, time elapsed from start 
of work to accident, location of accident in mine, and year 
of accident occurrence. 

The 14 variates that describe the mine and the injured 
miner were regressed on the categorical criterion variable 
using logistic regression techniques. 

RESULTS-MINER CHARACTERISTICS 

1. Age and experience. For practical purposes, none 
of the age and experience variates was related to the 
severity of injuries. Older miners with more experience in 
mining, at a particular task, and in a specific mine have the 
same chances for severe injuries as younger, less experi- 
enced miners. Bennett notes that previous studies of 
employee safety have reported both negative and positive 
correlations between age and injury incidence. 

2. Job classification. Previous reports indicate that 
mobile equipment operators, supervisors, and maintenance 
workers ranked high in mine injury incidence. However, 
Bennett's findings for injury severity do not follow the 
same trend as those reporting injury incidence. Super- 
visors and maintenance workers were less likely to have 
serious injuries than all other job classifications (track- 
worker, beltworker, bratticeworker, and general laborer). 
Mobile equipment operators and all other job classification 
have the same probability of serious injury. 

Bennett concludes that the potential for severe inju- 
ries has been underestimated for all other jobs that pro- 
vide service and support activities (trackworker, belt- 
worker, bratticeworker, and general laborer), and that 
training programs need to give greater attention to miners 
performing the service duties normally believed less 
dangerous. 

RESULTS-OTHER VARIATES 

1. Method of mining. Bennett found no statistically 
significant difference in the severity of injuries in con- 
ventional continuous, and longwall mining. 

2. Location of accident. Both intersections and other 
locations in the mine had the same likelihood as the face 
for severe injuries. The area least likely to have had 
serious injuries is the shaft and slope. Bennett concludes 
that because safety training has focused traditionally on 
the face area, there has been an underestimation of the 
potential hazards in other locations of the mine. 

3. Time elapsed since beginning of shift. No relation- 
ship was observed between the degree of injury and the 
shift time elapsed. Although the potential for fatigue 
increases as shift time passes, injury severity was distrib- 
uted relatively evenly throughout each shift. 



4. Year. The probability of injuries resulting in death, 
disability, or restricted work activity has been greater for 
each succeeding year from 1975 to 1981. Bennett con- 
cludes that current approaches to safety training have not 
reduced injury severity. 

CONCLUSION 

Bennett states the main implication of this study is that 
severe injuries can occur over a range of mine and miner 
characteristics: not merely with miners working at the 
face, as is commonly believed. 

DeMichiei, J., J. Langton, K. Bullock, and T. Wiles. Factors 
Associated With Disabling Injuries in Underground Coal 
Mines. MSHA, June 1982, 72 pp. 

OBJECTIVE 

Information was gathered so that a comparative analysis 
could be made between two populations of underground 
coal mines: those that had experienced an exceptionally 
high nonfatal days lost (NFDL) accident rate (N = 21) 
and those that had experienced an exceptionally low NFDL 
accident rate (N = 19). 

METHOD 

Four criteria were used in the selection of mines. First, 
the mines employed at least 150 underground miners. 
Second, the mines had experienced either an exceptionally 
high or an exceptionally low NFDL accident rate over a 
period of 3 yr (1977 through 1979). Third, an effort was 
made to insure that the mines geographically represented 
the bituminous coal producing areas of the nation, and 
fourth, the sample represented both union and nonunion 
operations. Information pertaining to employment figures 
and accident rates was furnished by MSHA's Health and 
Safety Analysis Center. A sample of mines agreed to 
participate in the study that included 21 mines with an 
exceptionally high NFDL accident rate and 19 mines that 
had experienced an exceptionally low NFDL accident rate. 

Three approaches were used to collect information: 
observing the mining methods and physical environment 
of the mine, interviewing miners, and administering 
questionnaires to individuals familiar with the mine's 
operation, i.e., mine superintendents, face supervisors, 
mine safety department personnel, mine safety and health 
committee members, and federal mine safety and health 
inspectors. The questionnaire included many rating scale 
items. The statistical significance of the difference be- 
tween the mean responses of persons from high- versus 
low-accident rate mines was computed for each question- 
naire item. 



20 



INTERVIEW RESULTS 



2. Morale 



1. Training 

DeMichiei notes that in many cases classroom size 
was too large, ranging from 50 to 200 students. Miners 
indicated on-the-job training is the most effective training 
received, and section supervisors were often the individuals 
responsible for such training. 

At low-accident rate mines, miners indicated that 
individuals in key management positions were receptive 
and responsive to miner requests and frequently solicited 
input from the miners concerning mine policies and pro- 
cedures. The miners perceived management as being 
totally committed to ensuring safety and health. For 
example, section supervisors were given latitude and 
flexibility and encouraged to take additional precautions, 
when in their judgment, such a response was deemed 
necessary. Miners at low-accident rate mines often de- 
scribed management-labor relations as being one of coop- 
eration. Management-labor relations were good not only 
between individual section crew members on the same 
shift, but also evident between these crews and section 
crews on other shifts. 

At many high-accident rate mines, while relations 
appeared good between individual crew members and 
between other crews on the same shift, such a relation- 
ship did not extend to section crews on other shifts. 
Often they found conditions that should have been cor- 
rected by the preceding shift. Miners felt that upper 
management failed to recognize the effects this situation 
had, not only on the section supervisors, but also on the 
accident rate. 

Unlike the low-accident rate mines, miners at several 
high-accident rate mines believed management to be one- 
sided since they had little input into the decision making 
process. At these same high rate mines, miners indicated 
that management lacked a systematic approach to decision 
making. Management's failure to plan resulted in con- 
flicting job assignments, since neither the men nor the 
materials necessary to perform the job were available. 
The miners indicated situations such as these caused 
frustration, often leading to open hostility between man- 
agement and labor. 

In the majority of high-accident rate mines, the lack of 
communication was identified as a primary cause for poor 
management-labor relations. Miners in general and, more 
specifically, labor representatives indicated their opinions 
and suggestions were never seriously considered by upper 
management. 

At several low-accident rate mines, miners indicated 
that management earnestly encouraged interaction between 
themselves and labor representatives. Management at 
most of the low-accident rate mines recognized the impor- 
tance of labor safety and health committees and actively 
sought out their participation in resolving safety and health 
problems. 



In seven high-accident rate mines, miners stated that 
poor morale was attributed to management's inability to 
plan effectively. Many times job assignments were con- 
flicting, tools and materials necessary were not available, 
and management was not receptive to miners' concerns. 

In the majority of high-accident rate mines, the miner's 
morale was negatively affected by management's failure to 
fairly and equitably enforce established company policies 
including absenteeism, job assignment, and standard 
operating procedures. 

Miners at high-accident rate mines were troubled by 
some of their coworkers' behavior: freeloaders who often 
took advantage of disability compensation, individuals who 
failed to pull their share of the workload, and persons who 
abused absentee policies for personal gains. Manage- 
ment's reluctance to deal forcefully with these issues 
caused frustration, and a general disrespect towards mine 
management. While some of these problems did exist at 
low-accident rate mines, they existed to a much lesser 
extent. 

Low-accident rate mines seemed to recognize that labor 
relations could be negatively influenced by inflexible 
company policies. When a company policy was causing 
conflict at the mine, management sought alternative solu- 
tions to the problem. For example, safety and health 
incentive programs were restructured to ensure more 
equitable accountability, vacations were scheduled to 
accommodate the miners, and absentee policies provided 
for being off work for extenuating circumstances. More- 
over, policies were developed in conjunction with labor 
and, once established, were equitably enforced. 

3. Safety 

In five high-accident rate mines, the mine superinten- 
dents had no direct involvement in the mine's safety and 
health program. Responsibility for implementing the pro- 
gram was mainly the safety department's. Safety depart- 
ment personnel at these five high-accident rate mines 
identified the lack of upper management involvement in 
safety matters as a serious impediment to improving safety 
and health conditions at the mine. While safety personnel 
were given the responsibility, they lacked the authority to 
require operating personnel follow standard work pro- 
cedures. Their role was one of mainly correcting unsafe 
conditions and the means to prevent them. 

In seven high-accident rate mines, safety personnel 
stated it was virtually impossible to perform effectively due 
to the lack of safety personnel. Miners working on shifts 
other than the day shift stated safety department personnel 
very seldom, if ever, made underground visits during other 
shifts. Any involvement by the safety department person- 
nel with miners was restricted to the shift the safety de- 
partment worked. Miners further stated this lack of com- 
mitment was a disregard by management for their safety. 



21 



A significant finding at 11 high-accident rate mines was 
statements made by safety and health committees concern- 
ing their reluctance to support management's decision to 
reprimand miners for unsafe acts, even though such 
actions were justified. They stated if such support was 
given to management, the rank and file miners usually 
reacted in a hostile manner. Management believed that 
such reaction by labor representatives prevented a good 
faith effort on the part of both parties to promote health 
and safety at the mines. At these same mines there ap- 
peared to be a general mistrust regarding miners' motives 
related to health and safety issues, i.e., a suspicion that 
miners might be using safety as a means to gain contrac- 
tual concessions. 

On the basis of the interview results DeMichiei con- 
cludes that: Many of the problems observed and 
discussed during interview sessions, with the excep- 
tion of materials handling, do not account for a large 
number of disabling injuries. On the other hand, the 
existence of such conditions and practices may be 
indicative of the underlying causal factors that dis- 
tinguish safe mines from unsafe mines. 

QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 

A questionnaire was administered to specific personnel 
groups other than miners (mine superintendents, section 
supervisors, mine safety department personnel, mine safety 
and health committee members, and federal mine inspec- 
tors) to gather information to supplement the data from 
observations and interviews conducted underground. 

1. Training 

Significant differences (p < .05) in mean responses 
to questionnaire items suggest that new miners in high- 
accident rate mines were less informed on how to do then- 
jobs than new miners in low-accident rate mines, that 
supervisors at high-accident rate mines did not provide the 
same degree of instruction and guidance to miners as did 
supervisors in low-accident rate mines, and that the overall 
safety programs were not as effective. 

2. Management quality 

Questionnaire results suggest that section supervisors at 
high-accident rate mines did not have the same degree of 
freedom to make decisions concerning health, safety, and 
production as did section supervisors at low-accident rate 
mines. Management put off making important decisions 
and lost more worktime through poor scheduling and 
planning at high-accident rate mines more often than at 
low-accident rate mines. Furthermore, management at 
higher-accident rate mines provided less support for 
decisions made by section supervisors concerning safety 
than did management at low-accident rate mines. 



3. Management-labor relations 

Questionnaire results suggest that management at high- 
accident rate mines is less interested in the welfare of 
workers both on and off the job than management at low- 
accident rate mines. Additionally, there is more conflict 
or misunderstanding over directions and job assignments 
given at high-accident rate mines. Moreover, good ideas 
fostered by miners get more serious consideration from 
management at low-accident rate mines. 

4. Physical environment 

Questionnaire results suggest although adverse condi- 
tions were generally found in both high- and low-accident 
rate mines, management made more of an effort to control 
adverse conditions at low-accident rate mines than at high- 
accident rate mines. Furthermore, miners contacted sec- 
tion supervisors regarding unsafe condition more often at 
low-accident rate mines than at high-accident rate mines. 

5. Safety 

Questionnaire results suggest that miners in low- 
accident rate mines are better provided with supplies, 
equipment, and the tools necessary for job accomplishment 
than are miners at high-accident rate mines. Responses 
also indicated that miners at low-accident rate mines 
participate much more conscientiously in a personal 
protection plan for the feet, eyes, and head. It was also 
indicated that miners at low-accident rate mines would 
more readily contact their supervisor when unsafe condi- 
tions or acts were observed and that management more 
often provided safety manuals to the miners. Finally, 
section supervisors in low-accident rate mines received 
more support from safety committeepersons when repri- 
manding miners for unsafe acts. 

6. Other findings 

Union-Nonunion status. According to management 
and labor responses at the five (relatively large) nonunion 
mines that participated in the study, the reasons for the 
low accident and injury experience was the flexibility 
afforded management and labor in dealing with issues 
affecting safety and health, production, and other matters. 
For instance, all employees in these mines could be task 
trained in the operation of all mine equipment and sub- 
sequently operate this equipment when qualified. This 
permitted employees to freely exchange job assignments 
when mutually agreeable. It was claimed that these 
policies alleviated boredom, created more job satisfaction, 
and fostered cooperation and camaraderie between and 
among mine employees. Additionally, management at 
nonunion mines structured vacation periods, created inno- 
vative sick leave policies, and introduced profit sharing 
plans, all of which were tailored to meet the employees' 



22 



personal and economic needs. This interest on the part of 
mine management in the well-being of the mine employees 
was thought to be responsible for high worker morale and 
positive attitudes toward safety and health. 

Productivity and accident rates. Initial results for the 40 
mines indicated that the low-accident rate mines produced 
significantly more short tons per worker day than the high- 
accident rate mines. After adjusting the data for the 
imbalance in geographic distribution and nonunion affilia- 
tion, the disparity still existed, but to a lesser extent. 

Absenteeism. Survey results indicated that absenteeism 
was much more of a problem at high-accident rate mines 
than at low-accident rate mines. DeMichiei reports that 
the average rate of absenteeism at the 21 high-accident 
rate mines was approximately 16 pet. On the other hand, 
at the 19 low-accident rate mines, the average was approx- 
imately 8 pet. 

Edwards, S. Quality Circles are safety circles. Natl. Saf. 
News, June 1983, pp. 31-35. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of this study was to report the impact of 
quality circles (QC's) on safety at a large surface coal 
mine. 

METHODS 

The Captain Mine is located in southwestern Illinois. 
The mine had more than 500 United Mine Workers of 
America(UMWA) and company employees at the time of 
the intervention. One person was sent to a week-long QC 
facilitator training course. The facilitator, four depart- 
ment heads, and two union representatives from the mine 
committee were chosen to serve as a steering committee. 
This committee established general goals and ground rules 
for the QC's. They decided that items of a contractual 
nature would be off limits. 

In the four departments selected for initial QC's, over 
80 pet of the employees volunteered to participate. Mem- 
bers were randomly selected from this pool of volunteers. 
Each QC group consisted of approximately five to eight 
persons. In addition to the four quality circle groups, the 
mine safety comitteepersons also agreed to go through the 
circle training. All the circles focused on problems that 
genuinely affect production or job performance. The types 
of problems the circles identified are those that would be 
expected at most mines: tool shortages, lack of support 
equipment, unavailability of parts or supplies, poor com- 
munications, inadequate housekeeping, inefficiencies in 
work place layout, and so on. 

QC meetings were usually held on shift for 1 h per 
week. Members first received training in circle techniques 
and processes. Training included such subjects as brain- 
storming, data collection and graph formats, and general 
group dynamics. During and immediately after their 8 h 
of training, the members used brainstorming to draw up a 
list of possible problems they would like to analyze and try 



to solve. Circle members voted and chose a problem they 
wanted to solve. They collected data on the problem. 
Once the problem was clearly delineated, they brain- 
stormed possible solutions and projected how cost-effective 
solutions might be. When the analysis of a problem was 
completed, a proposed solution, or recommendation, was 
agreed upon. If the solution required higher level action, 
a management presentation was made. 

RESULTS 

A very important benefit of QC's at Captain Mine, not 
initially anticipated, was improvement in the accident 
rate of circle members. When comparing the number of 
accidents reported 6 months prior to the QC training with 
the number of accidents reported 6 months after the QC 
training, it was found that, for the overall mine, accidents 
decreased by 17 pet; for departments with circles, acci- 
dents decreased by 18 pet; and for the members of QC's, 
accidents decreased by 41 pet. Prior to their involvement 
in the circle program, circle members had 58 pet of the 
accidents on their shift. In the 6 months after circles 
began, members had only 31 pet of the accidents on their 
shift. 

None of the circle projects involved what might be 
classified as strictly a safety problem. Yet, inherent in all 
the circles' projects, because they dealt with workplace 
layout or work procedures, was the potential for achieving 
a safer work environment. 

The author concludes that "QCs quite possibly may pro- 
vide a framework for employee input that helps improve 
safety and production, as workers not only identify a 
problem but become actively involved in the solution." 

Fiedler, F. Structured Management Training in Under- 
ground Mining-Five Years Later. Paper in Human Engin- 
eering and Human Resources Management in Mining. 
Proceedings: Bureau of Mines Technology Transfer 
Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, July 7-8, 1987; St. Louis, MO, 
July 15-16, 1987; and San Francisco, CA, July 21-22, 1987, 
comp. by staff. BuMines IC 9145, 1987, pp. 149-153. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of this study was to determine the effects 
of a structured management training intervention on pro- 
ductivity and safety at an underground trona mine. 

METHODS 

Fiedler's structured management training intervention 
was instituted at Texasgulf's trona mining operation in 
Granger, WY. The intervention consisted of highly struc- 
tured training in leadership and supervisory skills for man- 
agers and supervisors, using prepackaged and relatively 
standardized leadership and supervisory skills training 
programs, with relatively little interaction between the 
training consultant and company employees. 



23 



This underground mine is at the 1,300 ft level. Miners 
use continuous mining equipment and the room-and-pillar 
method of ore extraction. About 500 persons are em- 
ployed at this mining operation, with half of the work 
force engaged in underground operations. Most of the 
surface work force is employed in the ore mill, which 
processes the trona, and in administrative positions. Train- 
ing was conducted for managers and supervisors of the 
mine and ore mill. The Texasgulf Mine is located within 
a 10-mile radius of the other three major trona mines in 
the United States (Allied Chemical, Food Machinery 
Chemical (FMC), and Stauffer Chemical). These three 
mines provided an excellent basis for comparison since 
they share with Texasgulf the same geological conditions, 
the same labor pool, and compete in the same market. 

The intervention began with a series of interviews to 

(a) familiarize the consultants with the organization, 

(b) identify the major goals of management and super- 
visors, and (c) develop a list of critical behaviors to con- 
struct a performance evaluation scale for assessing the 
effects of the intervention. The training program itself 
consisted of four basic elements, described below. 

1. Objective supervisory performance appraisal. A per- 
formance appraisal system was designed so that managers 
and supervisors could become aware of their own strengths 
and weaknesses, and those of their subordinates. The 
rating scales concentrated on supervisory behaviors: how 
the supervisors act, and how they can change ineffective 
behaviors. This type of performance evaluation has been 
found effective by other industries in motivating employees 
to improve their behavior at work. 

2. Leadership training. The intervention used a pro- 
gram developed by Fiedler called Leader Match. This 
program is based on a generally accepted view in the 
literature on leadership that the performance of leaders or 
managers depends both on their personalities and on the 
specific situations in which they operate. The method 
further assumes that it is generally much easier to change 
critical components of the leadership situation, than one's 
personality or deeply ingrained habits of interpersonal 
interactions with subordinates. 

Leader Match teaches individuals to diagnose their own 
leadership styles, as well as to diagnose the leadership 
situations. The leaders are given detailed instruction on 
various methods for modifying the situations to match their 
particular management approaches and personalities. The 
instruction is provided by a trainer who uses a detailed 
manual, aided by videotaped illustrations, slides, and/or 
transparencies. 

3. Supervisory skills training. This training method 
used videotaped vignettes in actual and staged settings that 
taught the supervisor how to deal with specific problems 
with employees. Some of the problems addressed in- 
cluded: reinforcing safe behavior, correcting an employee, 
overcoming resistance to change, handling an irate em- 
ployee, and creating a cooperative workteam. 



4. Institutionalization. Finally, to assure that the train- 
ing would actually be used and would remain a permanent 
part of the organization, key personnel in the Texasgulf 
training department learned to administer the training 
methods. 

Altogether, the Leader Match, supervisory skills, and 
employee motivation training are about 20 h in length. 

The effects of the intervention were assessed by com- 
paring productivity and safety before and after the inter- 
vention at the Texasgulf mine. Data were also collected 
from MSHA concerning the productivity and safety per- 
formance of three nearby trona mines. These mines 
served as control sites. 

RESULTS-PRODUCTIVITY 

The intervention began in February 1979. In terms 
of average short tons per employeehour during the years 
from 1978 to 1981, the productivity of the Texasgulf mine 
was higher than the industry average throughout all 4 yr. 
However, what is especially noteworthy is the DIFFER- 
ENCE between Texasgulf and the industry average is 
greater for each of the 3 yr following the intervention than 
it was during the year BEFORE the intervention. The 
difference is especially large during 1980, the first full year 
following the intervention. Texasgulf s productivity was 21 
pet higher than the remainder of the trona industry during 
that year. 

The annual average number of short tons of trona 
mined per machine shift at Texasgulf has increased steadi- 
ly during 1982 to 1984. Unfortunately, comparable data 
for the remainder of the trona industry during this time 
period are unavailable. Although it is possible that the 
observed increases in productivity (relative to the industry 
average) could partially reflect changes other than the 
training intervention, Texasgulf managers recently reported 
they do not believe that any such changes have taken place 
at their company. 

RESULTS-SAFETY 

Prior to the training program, Texasgulf s safety record 
was considerably worse than other mines in the trona 
industry. In terms of number of injuries per 200,000 
employeehours during the years from 1978 to 1981, the 
injury rate at Texasgulf was higher than the industry 
average throughout all 4 yr. However, it is also clear that 
1981 represents a significant improvement over 1978 in 
both relative and absolute terms. The rate for Texasgulf 
in 1981 was almost half of what it was in 1978. Also, there 
are DIFFERENCES between the rates for Texasgulf and 
for the remainder of the industry. In 1978, the rate for 
Texasgulf was twice as high as the industry average. 
However, in 1981, the two rates are almost identical. 

The rate has dropped dramatically from its high of 
almost 14 in 1978, as compared with the rates during the 
years 1983 and 1984, which were both below the level of 
four incidents per 200,000 employeehours. Again, recent 



24 



interviews with Texasgulf managers suggest that they 
believe the reduction in accident rates is largely due to 
the structured management training program, and that 
other than the intervention, no changes have occurred 
which could account for the improved safety record. 

CONCLUSIONS 

To summarize, it appears that the structured manage- 
ment training intervention at Texasgulf was highly effective 
at improving both safety and productivity. The effects of 
the intervention were not a transient phenomenon. Data 
were collected for about 5 yr after the intervention was 
begun, and it appears that the initial improvements in 
safety and productivity have been maintained. 

Fiedler estimates that to install the structured man- 
agement training program of the type developed for the 
Texasgulf mine would cost from $4,000 to $10,000 for 
duplicating the already available training materials, and 
for consultant time required to train company personnel 
in administering the training program and to cover travel 
and other incidental expenses. This estimate does not 
take into account the cost of the time which the mine 
managers and supervisors would have to devote to the 
training sessions. For additional details also see Fiedler 
(12). 

Gaertner, G. H., P. D. Newman, M. S. Perry, G. P. Fisher, 
and K. Whitehead. Determining the Effects of Manage- 
ment Practices on Coal Miners' Safety (contract JO 145029, 
Westat, Inc.). BuMines OFR 39-88, 1987, 348 pp.; NTIS 
PB 88-221445. 

OBJECTIVE 

This study presented comparisons of the safety perfor- 
mance of underground coal mining companies using versus 
not using various types of management practices thought 
to affect safety. 

METHOD 

Data were collected from 10 underground coal mining 
companies that volunteered to participate in the research. 
There was considerable variation between these companies 
in injury rates, productivity, and size of mine work force. 
Some companies had excellent safety records and some 
had injury rates exceeding the national average. 2 Three of 
the ten companies were nonunion and the other seven 
were union. Data were collected from mines in eight 



2 In the 1983 the national average rate of injuries in underground 
coal mines was 10.07 per 200,000 h of exposure. 



different States (Virginia, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, Illinois, Kentucky, Alabama, and Colorado). 

Data were collected from company and mine records, 
and from interviews conducted with company- and mine- 
level personnel, including top level company officials, 
supervisors, and hourly employees. The interviews dealt 
with company safety policies, management's commitment 
to safety, and labor relations. Data were requested from 
MSHA on injuries, safety violations, production, and 
employment for the 62 mines being operated by the 10 
companies in this study. MSHA provided data on these 
variables for the 5-yr period from 1980 to 1984. 

The impact of selected safety policies was examined by 
looking at differences in safety indices between companies 
using a particular policy versus those NOT using that 
policy. Five policies were examined: 

1. Whether the company had formal investigations of 
lost-time accidents more extensive than those required by 
law. 

2. Whether the company had (and used) disciplinary 
policies applied to safety violations against miners and 
supervisors. 

3. Whether the company had special programs for 
miners suffering repeated accidents. 

4. Whether safety incentives (monetary or awards) 
were offered. 

5. Whether combined safety-productivity incentives 
were offered. 

Each company's use of safety policies was determined 
from the interviews conducted with both management and 
hourly employees. Since the injury rates being considered 
are for the period from 1980 to 1984, the researchers 
attempted to verify that the various policies under consid- 
eration (where they existed) had been established before 
1980. At each company where one of the above men- 
tioned policies existed, it was found that the policy had 
been put in place sometime prior to 1980. 

RESULTS-SAFETY POLICIES 

Table A-l lists each of the five policies that were 
considered and shows the rate of injuries experienced by 
companies using versus not using each policy. It was 
found that in companies that DO conduct special accident 
investigations beyond legal requirements, the rate of 
injuries per 200,000 hr is 3.87 lower than the correspond- 
ing rate for companies that do NOT conduct such special 
investigations. 



25 



Table A-1 .-Injury rates 1 for companies using versus 
not using each safety policy 



Policy 



Used 



Not used 



Special accident investigations 
Safety discipline policies . . . 
Accident repeaters program . 

Safety incentives 

Combined safety-production 
incentives 



Rate 


Sample 


Rate 


Sample 


6.32 


3 


10.19 


6 


8.20 


5 


9.88 


5 


10.15 


5 


7.93 


5 


9.04 


7 


9.04 


3 



5.64 



10.50 



injuries per 200,000 h of exposure. 



Companies were compared on the basis of whether or 
not they had safety discipline policies. When present, 
such policies seem to have a positive effect on safety (the 
difference in incidence rates between companies with and 
without special discipline policies was 1.68 per 200,000 h 
annually.) Gaertner notes that the importance of the dis- 
ciplinary policy seemed to be less punitive than indicative 
of top managerial commitment to safe operations. 

A policy element that did not appear to reduce injuries 
was programs for accident repeaters. Companies that had 
special programs to deal with repeaters actually had some- 
what higher injury rates than companies which did not 
(10.15 versus 7.93). It may be that companies with severe 
injury problems are driven to undertaking repeater pro- 
grams. Managers at companies supporting such programs 
frequently cited the costs of compensation as reasons for 
the programs. 

Safety incentives-by themselves-appear to make no 
difference in terms of injury rates. The rates for the two 
sets of companies were identical (9.04). However, there 
was quite a difference between companies that had com- 
bined safety-production incentives and those that did not. 
This is somewhat surprising given the relative lack of 
effect of safety incentives alone. Companies with com- 
bined safety and production incentives averaged only 5.64 
reported injuries per 200,000 h annually. Companies 
WITHOUT combined production-safety incentives aver- 
aged an 86 pet higher rate annually (10.50). 

Gaertner attempts to explain why there is such a differ- 
ence between the safety incentives versus the combined 
safety-productivity incentives. Safety incentives not tied to 
production tended to be relatively inexpensive and sym- 
bolic (T-shirts, caps, decals), and generally did not indicate 
a serious commitment by management to safety in the eyes 
of the supervisors and hourly employees. Rather they 
were usually intended as "reminders to the men, to keep 
thinking about safety," as one manager put it. Combined 
production-safety incentives seem more effective, and 
generally more costly. In one company, the cost of the 
production-safety incentives was 25 cents per short ton; in 
another it was 81 cents per short ton. 

Although the above data suggest that using incentive 
programs may be an effective way to improve safety per- 
formance, other data reported in this study suggest that 
such programs may not actually be reducing accidents to 



the extent one might think. There may be a tendency for 
incentive plans to inadvertently encourage miners to work 
injured to avoid reporting injury and losing their incentive 
pay. 

RESULTS-TOP MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT 

Gaertner notes that there were differences in the ways 
which top management expressed its commitment to 
employee safety. First, as previously discussed, there were 
differences in the use of safety policies. Second, there was 
a difference in the company's choice of vehicles for stress- 
ing safety. There was a tendency for companies with 
better safety records to rely heavily on one or two means 
of promoting safety. In one company the means was 
training and the use of computerized technology. In a 
second company, it was in applying engineering knowledge 
to production and safety problems. In a third company, it 
was a regular formal program of management audits of 
safety performance combined with regularized formal 
contacts. There did not appear to be one best vehicle for 
promoting safety, but all had several features in common: 

• Employee participation. The work force was involved 
in implementing the vehicle and evaluating its feasibility. 

• Pride in the vehicle. The vehicle for stressing safety 
was often perceived as being invented at and being unique 
to the company. 

• Vehicle was promoted by well-situated company advo- 
cate (not necessarily the company president or safety 
director). The vehicle seemed to be an effective way of 
illustrating to the work force that management considered 
safety to be a high priority. 

RESULTS-LABOR RELATIONS CLIMATE 

Based on information from interviews with management 
and the hourly work force, companies were categorized as 
having either a relatively positive or negative labor rela- 
tions climate. Next, the rates of injuries and citations at 
companies with a positive climate were compared with the 
corresponding rates at companies with a relatively negative 
climate. 

Companies with a positive versus negative labor rela- 
tions climate were compared on two measures of safety. 
It was found that the injury rate in companies with a 
negative labor relations climate is almost double that of 
the rate in companies with a positive climate (11.50 versus 
6.70). Companies were also compared in terms of the 
average annual rate of MSHA citations for significant and 
substantial safety violations per mine. The rate of such 
violations for companies with a positive labor relations 
climate was only about a third of the rate for companies in 
which the labor relations climate was relatively negative 
(12.73 versus 3.94). 



26 



Gaertner notes that in most companies where the labor 
relations climate was positive, the following conditions 
were observed: 

• an available and often used open-door policy to upper 
management (hourly interviewees said they spoke directly 
with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or superintendent 
and that they got a perceived positive response); 

• a fair percentage of time spent underground by com- 
pany management (hourly employees appreciated under- 
ground contact with upper level management, and informal 
conversation let others know that visits had been made); 

• a feeling of pride on the part of employees and super- 
visors in working for the company; 

• multiple communication vehicles were in existence in 
companies with a positive climate (newsletters; numerous 
communications on bulletin boards in the bath-house; 
letters sent to the employee's house; informal meetings 
with individuals and groups of miners). 

Gaertner cautions that the statistics presented above 
should be viewed as only tentative and preliminary evi- 
dence concerning the true effects these variables have on 
mine safety. They are based on data from only a very 
small sample of companies, and they are based on a 
correlational (single point in time) versus a longitudinal 
(across time) analysis of the relationships. 

Goodman, P. S. Determining the Effect of Incentive 
Programs on the Occurrence of Accidents, Injuries, and 
Productivity-Final Report (contract JO145012, Carnegie- 
Mellon Univ.). BuMines OFR 47-88, 1987, 143 pp.; NTIS 
PB 88-234257. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effect of 
a safety incentive plan on the occurrence of injuries at 
four underground coal mines. 

METHOD 

Goodman collected data on the lost-time accident 
frequency rate for 4 yr (from 1980 to 1983) from four 
underground coal mines owned by the same company and 
represented by the UMWA. These mines all instituted a 
nonmonetary safety bonus plan at the end of 1981, and the 
program continued until the end of 1983. 

The basic structure of the bonus program was as fol- 
lows. All employees with 1 yr or more of service can 
participate. Each month all employees without a lost-time 
accident receive a safety star for their hard hat. Each 
quarter employees without a lost-time accident are eligible 



for a drawing to win a major appliance. Employees must 
work 90 pet of scheduled workdays. At the end of the 
calendar year, each employee who has not had a lost-time 
accident will receive a safety prize. 

Mines 1 and 2 are somewhat similar and located in the 
same mining area of West Virginia. Mines 3 and 4 are 
together and located in southern Illinois. Mine 4 was shut 
down after 1982. 

RESULTS 

A review of the data in table A-2 shows remarkable 
variability in lost-time accident frequency rate in the base- 
line years, 1980 and 1981. 1980 is more comparable with 
the rates in 1982 and 1983. 

Table A-2.-Lost-time accident frequency rates 1 before 

(1980-81) and after (1982-83) institution 

of nonmonetary safety incentive program 

Year Mine 1 Mine 2 Mine 3 Mine 4 

1980 6.58 5.64 7.14 5.22 

1981 21.75 19.41 24.50 52.30 

1982 7.96 6.80 12.45 10.28 

1983 5J58 5J8 5JS7 ( 2 ) 

^ost-time accidents per 200,000 h of exposure. 
2 Shut down. 

In 1981 the rates are particularly high. Since 1981 was 
a strike year these high rates may reflect distractions sur- 
rounding pre- and post-strike activities. In any case, if the 
1981 period is considered special, there does not appear 
to be a connection between the nonmonetary incentive 
scheme and reduced accidents (1980 versus 1982-83). 

To get a more complete picture of the effects of the 
plan, data on miners' perceptions of this bonus plan were 
collected from miners at one of the mines (mine 2). 
Workers were asked about their perceptions of the safety 
program. These data are very important because they give 
some picture of the effectiveness of this safety bonus 
program. Solely looking at final incident data can be 
misleading. Miners' responses to the following interview 
question shows that a majority, but not all of the miners 
knew there was a safety bonus plan: 



"Is there a safety bonus at this mine?" 



CATEGORY LABEL 



(pet) 



Yes 


75.7 


No 


20.0 


Don't know 


4.3 



100.0 

Miners' responses to the following two interview questions 
suggest that the plan had not affected their safety con- 
sciousness or safety related behavior very much: 



27 



"How has the safety bonus plan affected your safety 
consciousness?" 



CATEGORY LABEL 

Increase 
No effect 
Decrease 



(pet) 

11.6 

86.5 
1.9 

100.0 



"Has the safety bonus plan had an effect on your safety 
related behavior?" 



CATEGORY LABEL 

Increase 
No effect 
Decrease 



(pet) 

11.5 

86.6 
1.9 

100.0 



Miners' responses to the following interview question 
suggest that the safety bonus had very little or no effect 
on improving how the crew works on safety issues: 

"What effect has the safety bonus plan had on your making 
certain that everyone on this crew works safely?" 



CATEGORY LABEL 

Increase 
No effect 
Decrease 



(pet) 

7.7 

90.4 

1.9 

100.0 



CONCLUSIONS 

Goodman concludes, "The basic picture is that the 
safety program has had little effect on workers perceptions 
or motivation. Unless the program can change worker 
beliefs and behavior, it is not likely to lead to major 
changes in accidents." Goodman believes that such pro- 
grams are not very effective because they do not identify 
critical safety behaviors and there is not a close connection 
between behavior and rewards. "The quarterly reward was 
on a lottery, and only one employee wins. The annual 
reward was over such long periods as to attenuate the 
relationships between behavior and rewards." 

Goodman, P. Assessing Organizational Change: The 
Rushton Quality of Work Experiment. Wiley, 1979, 
391 pp. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of this study was to determine the impact 
of an intervention on safety, productivity, quality of em- 
ployee work-life, and several other outcome measures. 
The major points of the intervention were as follows: 



1. An experimental section called the "South" section 
was established in the mine, comprising 27 volunteers, 9 
to a shift. 

2. Every worker in the experimental section was on 
top pay. This meant the experimental section would cost 
at most $324 more each week than other sections, not a 
prohibitive cost factor to the mine's management. 

3. All members of each crew were trained by the com- 
pany to be capable of performing any job in the section, 
from continuous miner operation to roof bolting. The 
entire crew was also given special training in State and 
Federal mine safety laws, so each miner would know what 
constitutes a violation. 

4. Each of the three crew supervisors in the section 
had responsibility and authority primarily for the safety of 
the crew. The responsibility to management for the day- 
to-day production of coal by the crew was transferred to 
the entire team of nine workers. 

5. Grievances by any member of the section would be 
dealt with primarily by the crew involved, in what is some- 
times called peer discipline. If the crew couldn't cope with 
a grievance itself, it would then be processed through the 
local union's formal grievance machinery. 

METHOD 

Rushton is a medium-sized mine in central Pennsylva- 
nia. There were approximately 180 employees when the 
experiment began late in 1973. Of these, 35 were man- 
agerial, the remainder were nonexempt and members of 
the UMWA. At the beginning of the evaluation, there 
were three working sections in the mine, a maintenance 
group, a general labor group, and the cleaning plant. 

The changes which were hoped to facilitate improve- 
ments in safety were as follows: (1) the experimental 
group received more formal training about safety practices 
and the law; (2) the experiment introduced a new reward 
system to motivate the workers toward good safety prac- 
tices. Intrinsic rewards were increased: the workgroup 
had been restructured to provide the workers greater 
opportunities for feelings of responsibility and accomplish- 
ment if safety levels improved. Extrinsic rewards were 
also increased through formal feedback sessions for the 
workers concerning their performance on safety and other 
activities. (3) The supervisors in the experimental section 
were no longer caught in the conflict between production 
and safety. They could expend all their energies on safety. 
Supervisors in the nonexperimental sections had continual- 
ly to balance production and safety demands. 

Safety was measured by the number and type of acci- 
dents, the number and type of violations, ratings on the 
quality of safety made by independent observers, as well as 
by the union and management, and by qualitative reports 
from the on-site observers. The experimental sections 
were compared with control group sections on these 
measures both before and after the intervention. 



28 



RESULTS 

The accident data provide no conclusive evidence on 
whether the intervention had an effect. However, the 
accident data are not a particularly good measure of the 
intervention's effectiveness because the experimental 
section exhibited a very low accident rate before the 
intervention even began. (For accident rate data see 
Goodman (1979), table 12.1, p. 214.) 

Analyses of the responses to interview questions suggest 
that most respondents viewed the program as positively 
affecting safety. If one divides union respondents into 
experimental and control, both groups endorse the positive 
effects of the intervention on safety over time. Members 
of management, many of who were not strongly committed 
to the program, also reported that safety practices had 
improved. 

Analyses based on federal safety violations indicate that 
in the first experimental period (the first year following the 
intervention), there was a slight drop in violations in the 
South section (-7 pet) and a significant increase in the 
other two sections ( + 121 pet and +250 pet). (See Good- 
man, table 12.4, p. 220.) 

Analyses based on the number of shifts lost by each 
section due to inspectors closing down a section indicate 
that at the baseline the sections are the same. In the first 
experimental period all sections show an increase, but the 
experimental section shows the smallest increase. In the 
remaining periods (December 1974 to December 1976), 
the number of shifts lost decreases virtually to zero. (See 
Goodman, table 12.5, p. 221.) 

In the first experimental period the number of state 
violations in the South section is less than in the other 
sections and less than its own baseline. No differences 
were observed among sections in the remaining periods. 
Goodman concludes, "Overall there is a slight improve- 
ment in the experimental section (relative to the others) 
with respect to violations in the first 11 months of opera- 
tion." (See Goodman, table 12.6, p. 222.) 

Analyses based on quarterly global ratings of section 
safety by federal and state inspectors indicate that the 
experimental section's overall safety record was better than 
the other two sections, although the East section was 
virtually identical to the South section in the last half of 
1976. (See Goodman, table 12.7, p. 223.) 

CONCLUSIONS 

Regarding the effects of the intervention on safety, 
Goodman writes: 

The overall finding is that the experimental interven- 
tion did lead to an improvement in safety practices. . . 
the experiment did affect safety behaviors, that is, 
the men in the South section put into effect safety 
practices that would prevent accidents. They were 
more pro-active toward safety than they had been 
prior to the experiment. 



The structure of the program provided knowledge about 
safety practices that previously was not available. Making 
the supervisor's role safety, rather than production, "min- 
imized the negative reinforcement workers sometimes 
received from their bosses when they wanted to do safety 
work." Periodic meetings with the miners provided them 
with formal feedback on how safety behavior matched 
safety goals; they were a problem-solving arena where new 
safety practices were developed, and offered a direct 
opportunity to reinforce good safety behavior. This is 
absent in most traditional safety programs. Lastly, the 
autonomous workgroup concept increased workers' feel- 
ings of responsibility for achieving high safety levels. 

The mine president and many miners wanted the inter- 
vention to be expanded to the other three sections of the 
mine, and in August 1975 this proposal was put to a union 
vote. The proposal was rejected by a very narrow margin 
(79 versus 75). Many reasons have been proposed for the 
rejection, including the possibility that miners who were 
not in the experimental South section had become envious 
of the freedom, flexibility, and higher pay of the experi- 
mental section. By the end of 1977 the intervention efforts 
had entirely disappeared. 

For further details see Trist (29) and Mills (20). 

Goodman, P. S. Analysis of Miners' Job Attendance 
Behavior and Its Relationship to Miners' Accidents and 
Injuries-Final Report (contract JO328033, Carnegie- 
Mellon Univ.). BuMines OFR 60-86, 1985, 278 pp.; NTIS 
PB 86-216306. 

OBJECTIVE 

This study examined the effects or consequences of 
absenteeism on mining accidents. 

METHOD 

The concept of familiarity was introduced to explain the 
impact of absenteeism on accidents. Familiarity refers to 
the level of specific knowledge one has about the unique 
aspects of the workplace. This includes knowledge about 
the unique characteristics of particular machinery, materi- 
als, physical environment, people, and programs that exist 
in a particular mine section at a particular time. The 
central premise is that lack of familiarity leads to more 
dangerous conditions that, in the absence of compensatory 
changes in the level of care taken by a miner, would con- 
tribute to higher rates of accidents. 

Unfamiliarity can affect three types of people in coal 
mining. 

1. Because the physical characteristics of a mine 
section change from day to day, an absent worker, on 
returning to the mine will be less familiar with the 
workplace, and, ceteris paribus, will have a higher 
probability of having an accident. 



29 



2. When a miner is absent another miner is generally 
assigned as a replacement. Such a person is generally less 
familiar with the work setting and, ceteris paribus, more 
likely to have an accident. 

3. In a typical crew configuration, most mining activi- 
ties require coordination among pairs of individuals who 
work closely together: the miner operator and the helper, 
the roof bolter and the helper, and the two shuttle car 
operators. Considering such dyads, the worker adjacent to 
the replacement may also be placed in a more dangerous 
situation because of lack of familiarity with the replace- 
ment's mining practices, and resulting difficulties in 
coordinating activities in an inherently dangerous environ- 
ment. Hence, this adjacent worker or partner of a re- 
placement is expected to have a high probability of having 
an accident. 

Data were gathered from production crews in five 
underground coal mines. A unique data set was created 
that traced on a daily basis the absence event, the com- 
pany's policy on replacement, and the occurrence of an 
accident. Information on these variables was obtained 
during approximately 70,000 miner days worked, corres- 
ponding to roughly 60 production crews observed for an 
entire year. During these 70,000 miner days, the number 
of reported accidents was approximately 340, or about one 
accident every 205 miner days worked. 

The following strategy was applied to each of the five 
mines: 

(a) Define various mutually exclusive categories 
among which the degree of familiarity is expected to differ 
importantly. 

(b) Assign every miner day to one of these categories 
and count the number of miner days worked in each of 
these situations (i.e., measure the level of exposure to 
danger). 

(c) Count the number of accidents experienced by 
miners assigned to each of these categories. 

(d) Compute accident rates (i.e., numbers of accidents 
per 200 miner days of exposure). 

(e) Assess quantitatively the differences in accident 
rates across the familiarity categories. 

Eleven dyad-familiarity categories were defined as follows: 

A Two regulars, neither absent previous day. 

B Two regulars, one absent previous day. 

C Two regulars, both absent previous day. 

D Two replacements, neither absent previous day. 



E Two replacements, one absent previous day. 

F Two replacements, both absent previous day. 

G One regular, one replacement, neither absent pre- 
vious day. 

H Regular absent previous day, replacement present 
previous day. 

I Regular present previous day, replacement absent 
previous day. 

J One regular, one replacement, both absent 
previous day. 

K One miner working without partner. 

Multiple regression analysis was used to examine the 
effects of familiarity on accident rates. An observation is 
a dyad-familiarity category for a particular mine, and thus 
the sample size (with five mines and 11 dyad-familiarity 
categories) is 55. Accident rates are the dependent vari- 
able. Inter-mine differences were statistically controlled 
for, and a weighing procedure was used to adjust for large 
differences in miner days of exposure used in calculating 
the accident rates. 

RESULTS 

Working alone is the safest of the 11 categories of 
familiarity. 

Categories A versus F. The hypothesis that two regu- 
lars, neither absent on the previous day have lower acci- 
dent rates than two replacements who were both absent 
on the previous day received considerable quantitative 
support. The accident rates in the extreme high-familiarity 
category are estimated to be, on average, less than those 
for the extreme low-familiarity category by about 0.7 
accidents per 200 miner days worked, with inter-mine 
differences and the varying levels of exposure taken into 
account. When compared with the average accident rate 
for the entire sample of 0.98 accidents per 200 miner days 
worked, this estimate of 0.7 suggests an impact of con- 
siderable importance. 

Categories D versus F. The hypothesis that two re- 
placements, neither absent previous day, have lower rates 
than two replacements both absent previous day received 
substantial quantitative support-the estimated difference 
is about .75 accidents per 200 days. 

Categories C versus F. The hypothesis that two regu- 
lars who were both absent on the previous day have lower 
rates than two replacements who were both absent on the 
previous day received quite strong support, with an esti- 
mated differential of about .6 accidents per 200 days. 

Most of the other expected differences between pairs 
of accident rates were in the expected direction, but were 
relatively small in magnitude. 



30 



CONCLUSIONS 

The findings suggest that prior day absences have the 
effect of increasing accidents, and that regular miners have 
lower accident rates than replacement miners. Goodman 
states that although it seems clear that absences are not 
among the primary factors related to mining accidents, 
they may be important among those factors that can be 
addressed by mine policy. Thus, absenteeism appears to be 
one factor to be considered in programs designed to re- 
duce accidents. 

National Academy of Sciences-National Research Coun- 
cil. Toward Safer Underground Coal Mines. NAS, 1982, 
190 pp. 

OBJECTIVES 

The purpose of this study was as follows: 

1. Look for correlations between various factors and 
variations in the rate of lost-time accidents experienced in 
United States underground coal mines. 

2. Look for factors that might account for variations 
in the rate of lost-time accidents experienced at the 19 
underground coal mining companies producing the most 
coal in the United States. 

3. Look for differences between mines that have an 
extremely high rate of lost-time accidents versus mines 
that have an extremely low rate of lost-time accidents. 

Different sets of data were analyzed in order to achieve 
these three objectives. 

METHOD-FIRST DATA SET 



accounted for 15 pet of total employeehours, but 40 pet of 
all fatalities. 

PRODUCTIVITY - SAFETY.-The researchers con- 
clude that the (cross-sectional) association between pro- 
ductivity and disabling injury rates, while perhaps slightly 
negative, is sufficiently weak to be disregarded as an 
important factor in explaining differences between injury 
rates in mines. 

AGE OF MINER— There is no evidence of an age 
trend with respect to fatality rates or permanent disability 
injury rates. However, there is a very marked correlation 
between age and disabling injury rates. Miners between 
the ages of 18 and 24 have an injury rate nearly twice that 
of miners 25 to 34, who have a rate about 25 pet higher 
than miners 35 to 44, who in turn have a rate over 40 pet 
higher than miners who are at least 45 yr of age. Hence, 
a young miner (18-24) is about three times more likely to 
be injured than is a miner 45 yr of age or older, about 
twice as likely to be injured than is a miner 25-44. This 
relationship is consistent across the 15 companies that 
provided data on the age of their work force, as well as for 
each of the years 1978, 1979, and 1980. Furthermore, the 
strong association between age and disabling injury rate 
was apparent for each of the major categories of accident 
types that cause injuries. 

METHOD-SECOND DATA SET 

The second data set consisted of a subset of the first 
data set. Analyses were performed on the data for 19 of 
the 20 largest bituminous coal producing companies in the 
United States in 1978. (One company went out of business 
shortly after 1978.) 

RESULTS-SECOND DATA SET 



These data are based on the information mine opera- 
tors provide to MSHA concerning accidents, employment, 
and productivity. Data on every lost-time injury that were 
reported to have occurred in a United States underground 
coal mine during the 3-yr period 1978 through 1980 were 
included in the analyses; such injuries numbered nearly 
40,000 including fatalities. These data were analyzed for 
correlations between injury rates by mine and company 
and such factors as type of accident, mine size, seam 
thickness, union status, productivity, geographical location 
(by state), and age of miners. Fifteen large coal mining 
companies provided the researchers with data on the age 
of the underground miners in their entire work force. 

RESULTS-FIRST DATA SET 

MINE SIZE.-The fatality rate for mines with 50 or 
fewer employees (0.14) is about three times that of mines 
with over 250 employees (0.05), and almost twice that 
of mines with 51-250 employees. Small mines (< 50) 



The researchers found large and persistent differences 
between the injury rates of the major companies that con- 
trol underground coal mines in the United States. Such 
differences could not be explained by physical, techno- 
logical, or geographical factors that were included in the 
analyses. The researchers conclude that "these differences 
are due, apparently, to factors internal to the companies." 
This issue was examined in greater detail in the third data 
set. 

METHOD-THIRD DATA SET 

Twelve large mines (150 workers or more) were visited 
by the research team. These mines were selected partially 
because they represented the extremes of safety perfor- 
mance, i.e., some had quite low injury rates and others had 
quite high injury rates. The research team developed a set 
of 28 questions to serve as a guide, but the teams were 
encouraged to follow their own course in conducting inter- 
views with miners and management personnel. Three 



31 



major types of characteristics thought to be associated with 
mine safety were investigated: (1) the quality of labor 
relations, (2) the extent of management's commitment to 
safety (as reflected by a proper balance between produc- 
tion and safety, safety meetings and contacts, rewards for 
safety, and good housekeeping in the mine), and (3) absen- 
teeism rate. 

RESULTS-THIRD DATA SET 

The researchers state: 

All seven mines with low injury rates appeared to 
have a cooperative attitude between management 
and labor; an adversarial attitude was observed in 
three of the five mines with high injury rates. It is 
also apparent that the mines with higher injury rates 
tended to have higher absenteeism rates. In three of 
the five mines with high injury rates, at least one of 
the above mentioned aspects of management com- 
mitment to safety was found to be lacking. 

The researchers conclude that differences in the injury 
rates of these 12 mines appear to be due in part to the 
degree of a company's cooperation with employees in its 
mines. 

At the seven mines with low injury rates that were 
visited, good relations between management and 
labor were apparent and were considered by the 
employees as being important to safety. Among the 
commonly recognized elements of these relations 
were an open-door policy at the manager's office and 
a willingness to accept suggestions re safety. At 
these mines the union generally supported the com- 
pany's enforcement of safety rules. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Based on their visits to underground coal mines, their 
case studies of coal companies, and their discussions with 
industry, union, and government officials, the researchers 
conclude that among the most important factors influenc- 
ing mine safety are as follows: (1) management's com- 
mitment, as reflected by the attention and resources it 
devotes to improving safety, (2) cooperation between 
management and labor in developing and implementing 
safety programs, and (3) the quality of training of employ- 
ees and managers. 

Peters, R., and L. Schaffer. Field Tests of a Model Health 
and Safety Program for the Mining Industry. BuMines IC 
9075, 1986, 36 pp. 

OBJECTIVES 

The objectives of this research were to better define the 
essential features of effective health and safety programs 
for the mining industry, to develop a health and safety 



program that incorporates these essential features, and to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the model program at a coal 
mining and a gold mining company. 

METHOD 

Based on a review of the safety literature, and what is 
known about the mining industry, a model program was 
defined in terms of five fundamental conditions: 

1. There must be no separation of production and safe- 
ty and health in the management of the mining operations. 

2. There must be an honest commitment by the top 
managers to constantly improve the operation's health and 
safety performance. 

3. Managers and supervisors at all levels must re- 
ceive basic training in safety, health, and loss control 
management. 

4. Management emphasis on health and safety in staff- 
ing and performance evaluation. 

5. Feedback mechanisms that have reliable and readily 
detectable safety and health components should be used, 
e.g., investigation of all accidents and near misses, safety 
audits, and job performance sampling. 

A written model program tailored to the two compa- 
nies' circumstances and needs was developed and the 
following agreement was reached between the researchers 
and the top company manager at each company: 

1. The top company manager accepted the program as 
conceptually sound and agreed to put it into effect in the 
company. 

2. The researchers agreed to complete an initial health 
and safety audit of the company's operations and, from the 
information obtained, to define a program tailored to the 
company's circumstances and needs. The researchers and 
top company managers agreed that the model program 
would contain specific recommendations for management 
action. 

3. The top company manager agreed to consider each 
recommendation carefully and advise the researchers of 
the decision regarding acceptance. If the decision was to 
not accept a recommendation, the researchers would be 
informed of the reason so they could record the informa- 
tion for use in the final evaluation of the program. 

4. The researchers agreed to assist the manager in 
implementing the program by: (a) conducting 8 h of train- 
ing for subordinate managers, supervisors, and shift bosses 
in loss control fundamentals; (b) providing 8 h of training 
to supervisors and workers selected by the top manager in 
the use of an accident investigation methodology developed 



32 



by the Bureau; (c) furnishing available materials for train- 
ing mobile equipment operators and assisting in course 
development to improve the company's task training; 
(d) providing health and safety technical literature and 
other information related to the company's loss control 
problems; (e) visiting the company's operations once a 
month for a calendar year, or longer, to assist in program 
implementation and obtain evaluation data (and the man- 
ager agreed to permit the researchers unrestricted access 
to all elements of the operation for observation and to all 
available information related to occupational injuries, 
illnesses, accidents, near misses, and incidents of any kind 
that produce loss); (f) providing the company management 
periodically with an oral report on observations made, 
additional management actions recommended, and count- 
ermeasure options suggested for consideration; (g) at the 
end of the evaluation period, presenting an oral report 
covering all of the model program research at the com- 
pany's operations. 

In short, the model program was implemented primarily 
by providing training on loss control and accident inves- 
tigation, and by providing technical assistance with health 
and safety problems. 

The coal mining company was located in easter Ken- 
tucky. It operated two underground low coal drift mines 
using continuous miners and two surface mines using 
mountain top removal techniques. In 1982, the company's 
total salable production of coal was nearly 800,000 mt, 
of which 65 pet was from surface operations. Average 
employment during 1982 was 340. All of the hourly 
employees were represented by a union local. 

The gold mining company was located in central 
Nevada. Ore was mined by power shovels and trucked to 
a crusher at the mine site. In 1982, this single mine moved 
approximately 2.203 million mt of overburden and other 
waste and 0.743 million mt of ore. There was no union. 
The average number of employees in 1982 was 113. 

In order to assess the effectiveness of the program, 
monthly statistics were generated on the rate of occupa- 
tional injuries and accidents, and the severity of injuries 
(as measured by the number of days of work lost during 
recovery), and employees were observed performing a 
large number of randomly selected jobs on several occa- 
sions throughout a 15-month period. The purpose of these 
observations was to estimate the proportion of the work 
force that was working in the presence of one or more of 
three types of safety deficiencies: 

Type A-individual job performance deficiencies, which 
could be corrected by the employee along, e.g., an employ- 
ee is observed not to be wearing a seatbelt. 

Type B-individual job performance deficiencies, which 
could be corrected only through employer action beyond 
the control of the individual employee, e.g., an employee 
is observed driving a truck that does not contain a usable 
seatbelt. 



Type C-deficiencies that were common to several jobs 
of the same kind, or various kinds, and correctable only 
through substantial changes by the employer in mining 
plan, operating policies, or job structuring, e.g., allowing 
deviations from the approved roof control plan. 

RESULTS 

During the 15 months of observation at the coal mining 
operation, the following improvements were noted: a 
gradual decrease in the rate of injuries per month, a 
substantial decrease in the severity of injuries (from 105 
days lost per month to 10 days), and a substantial 
reduction in the proportion of sampled jobs with one or 
more safety deficiencies (from 74.3 pet to 36.6 pet). 
Although the proportions of all three types of safety 
deficiencies were reduced, the greatest reduction was in 
type A, e.g., failure to use personal protective equipment 
and messy work areas. 

During the period in which the gold m inin g operation 
was observed, three types of improvements were noted. 
First, although there was no downward trend of signifi- 
cance in the rate of injuries per month, the severity of 
injuries decreased substantially-only one-third of the total 
days lost due to accidents in 1982 are attributable to 
accidents which occurred in the last half of that year. 
Second, the proportion of jobs with one or more safety 
deficiencies decreased substantially (86.4 to 19.1 pet). As 
at the coal company, the proportions of jobs having each 
of the three types of safety deficiencies were reduced. 
Substantial improvements in type C deficiencies occurred 
at the maintenance yard, crushing facility, mill and mainte- 
nance shop, and on the haul roads. Third, the incidence 
of accidents resulting in equipment and/or facility damage 
(but no injuries) was reduced by about 50 pet. This reduc- 
tion in accidents is quite noteworthy, considering that the 
uninsured loss (cost of parts and labor for repairs) asso- 
ciated with the 56 noninjury accidents reported at this 
mine during 1982 was $235,950. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The researchers believe that it would take a minimum 
of 9 to 12 months to achieve full implementation of the 
model program in most mines, and that the model pro- 
gram can be implemented with minimal outside help. 
They suggest that because implementation is inexpensive 
and the loss reduction is very substantial, the benefit-to- 
cost ratio is quite favorable. 

For additional details also see Schaffer (28). 

Pfeifer, C, /. Stefanski, and C. Grether. Psychological, 
Behavioral, and Organizational Factors Affecting Coal 
Miner Safety and Health (DHEW contract HSM 99-72- 
151). 1976, 319 pp.; NTIS PB 275 599. 



33 



OBJECTIVE 

Information was gathered so that a comparative analysis 
could be made between two populations of underground 
coal mines: those that had experienced an exceptionally 
high-accident rate and those that had experienced an 
exceptionally low-accident rate. 

METHODS 

Questionnaire data were collected from 14 matched 
pairs of coal mines, with one high-accident mine and one 
low-accident mine in each pair. Data were collected from 
54 union officials, 102 supervisors, 27 safety directors, 
32 mine managers, 77 miners' wives, 157 above-ground 
miners, and 612 underground miners. The topics covered 
in the survey were as follows: attitudes toward safety and 
accident causes, major problems in the mine, general 
company attitudes, general miner attitudes, physical and 
psychological problems, safety and health equipment, use 
of health programs, training, job behaviors, job satisfac- 
tion, company safety programs, and perceptions of outside 
organizations. The questionnaire included many rating 
scale items. The statistical significance of the difference 
between the mean responses of persons from high-versus 
low-accident rate mines was computed for each question- 
naire item. 

RESULTS 

1. Attitudes toward safety and accident causes 

The data indicate that differences in concern for safety 
practices from mine to mine are perceived by the person- 
nel working at the mines, and that, in general, companies 
which are viewed to have a greater concern for safety 
practices do in fact have better safety records. 

In comparison with the rating scale responses from 
miners in high-accident mines, miners in low-accident 
mines felt that keeping good safety records and uphold- 
ing the company safety record were significantly more 
important to their companies, and that having competition 
among workcrews was significantly less important to their 
companies. 

Mine personnel were asked the extent to which 18 
different items were related to accidents in the mine. Four 
items were seen as related to accidents to a significantly 
greater degree in high-accident mines: dust, lighting, 
supervisors, and faulty equipment. 

2. Major problems in the mine 

All six groups of mine personnel felt that too much 
absenteeism was a problem in their mine. Labor groups 
felt that lack of management training and poor equipment 
maintenance were very often problems in their mine. 
Management groups, on the other hand, felt that too low 



worker productivity and too high job turnover were prob- 
lems more often than not. There were no statistically 
significant differences between the responses of mine 
personnel from high-versus low-accident mines. 

3. General company attitudes 

Although managerial groups feel that more emphasis is 
placed on safety by the company than on production, this 
emphasis is not communicated to miners, who feel that the 
company places more emphasis on production. Pfeifer 
believes these results suggest that coal companies could 
communicate company policy and philosophy to miners in 
more effective ways than they have in the past. No signif- 
icant differences were observed between the responses of 
high and low accident mine personnel to the questions in 
this section. 

4. General miner attitudes 

Underground miners appear to be much less fatalistic 
than has been assumed in the past. Responses to several 
independent questions confirm that miners do feel that 
they have some control over their safety. 

Supervisors and management were asked the extent to 
which each of 12 miner attitudes contributed to accidents 
in their mines. Of the 12 items listed, three were rated 
by both supervisors and management as causing accidents 
relatively more frequently than other items. These items 
were just being careless and not following safety rules, just 
not giving a damn, and not using good common sense and 
judgement. 

This appears to support DeJoy's (8) arguments concern- 
ing the existence of a biased tendency for supervisors to 
perceive workplace accidents as caused by factors internal 
to the worker (as opposed to themselves or to the worker's 
environment). He states: 

The supervisor is likely to explain the poor safety 
performance of people in his or her department in 
terms of employee carelessness or lack of effort. 
Attributing responsibility for poor safety perfor- 
mance to factors internal to the employees also tends 
to absolve the supervisor of direct blame. 

In comparison with the low-accident mines, managers 
in high-accident mines felt that accidents were caused 
more often by miners worrying about debts, being upset 
about marriage problems, bad health and feeling bad, and 
hurrying to begin a vacation. 

5. Safety and health equipment 

As a group, underground miners felt that the two pri- 
mary reasons for not using safety and health equipment 
were that it is uncomfortable, and that it gets in the way 
of working. Underground miners did not feel that other 



34 



miners making fun of persons wearing equipment was a 
reason for equipment not being used. Significant differ- 
ences were found in several instances between mean 
responses of personnel in low- accident mines and high- 
accident mines. Poor equipment maintenance, lack of 
tr ainin g, and the fact that equipment isn't any good were 
cited as being important as reasons for not using equip- 
ment by underground miners in high-accident mines. On 
the other hand, the fact that there is no need for it and 
that it is difficult to get were cited as being more impor- 
tant as reasons for not using equipment by underground 
miners in low- accident mines. 

6. Training 

There is a consistent tendency for training on various 
topics to be rated as better by underground miners at low- 
accident mines. Results emphasize the importance of good 
training. Good training in how the electrical power system 
works, dealing with hazards (such as gases, coal dust, and 
noise), and how to use tools and equipment is more 
prevalent in mines with lower accident rates. Although 
safety tr ainin g is reportedly offered to all employees, and 
a variety of training techniques are used, Pfeifer notes that 
"it apparently quite often misses the mark." 

7. Safe job behaviors of miners and supervisors 

Miners in low-accident mines reported that other 
miners wear safety glasses and cleanup the work area 
more often, and they bridge the circuit breaker when a 
circuit overloads less often than miners in high-accident 
mines. 

In the underground miners group, significant differ- 
ences were observed between mean responses in high- 
versus low-accident mines on 6 of the 12 items. Miners in 
low-accident mines reported that miners get along with 
each other, can depend on each other, and report small 
accidents more often than did miners in high- accident 
mines. On the other hand, workcrews apparently try to 
outdo other crews, and miners get mad if another miner 
works too fast or too slow more often in high-accident 
mines. 

Miners in low-accident mines reported that they wear 
safety glasses, report safety and health hazards to the 
supervisor, and go to the doctor when they are sick signifi- 
cantly more often than miners in high-accident mines. 

Surprisingly, miners in low-accident mines also reported 
that they take chances or cut corners and smoke in the 
mine significantly more often than miners in high-accident 
mines. 

According to the responses of underground miners, the 
following behaviors of supervisors occur more often in low- 
accident mines: 

1. Allowing miners to work at their own speed. 

2. Giving miners a pat on the back when they follow 
safety procedures. 



3. Wearing respirators in dusty conditions. 

4. Reminding miners of safety and health practices. 

5. Showing real concern for workers' welfare. 

Miners' responses also suggest that supervisors in low- 
accident mines also refrain from the following activities: 

1. Asking miners to do things that are against miners' 
better judgment. 

2. Cutting corners on safety. 

3. Pushing hard for production. 

Miners in low-accident mines indicated that they had to 
do three activities significantly less frequently than miners 
in high-accident mines: doing a lot of things at the same 
time, working without clear-cut duties, and taking care of 
absentees' jobs. Supervisors in low-accident mines felt that 
miners had to take care of absentees' jobs significantly less 
often than in high-accident mines. In comparison with 
high-accident mines, significantly fewer managers in low- 
accident mines felt that miners had to answer to more than 
one person. 

8. Company safety programs 

Safety directors ranked the relative effectiveness of five 
types of safety incentives as follows: 

• inclusion of safety attitude and behavior in worker 
performance evaluations. 

• publicity of outstanding safety performance. 

• r unnin g tally of accident-free employee-hours. 

• recognition awards. 

• cash awards and/or prizes (least effective). 

Safety directors were asked what changes they would 
suggest to make their positions more effective. The most 
frequent response, given by eight safety directors, was that 
they should be given more authority in safety matters. 

9. Perceptions of union influence on safety 

Underground miners in low-accident mines reported 
that the union bargained with management for safer and 
healthier mines and discussed safety and health topics in 
union meetings to a significantly greater extent than under- 
ground miners in high-accident mines. Union officials in 
low-accident mines felt that the union took care of injured 
miners and their families to a significantly greater extent 
than union officials in high-accident mines. 



35 



CONCLUSIONS 

Pfeifer concludes: 

results of the survey seem to underline the fact that 
future improvements in accident records are depen- 
dent m ainl y on behavioral techniques. It appears 
that training is the behavioral technique considered 
most often by miners and management alike as a 
way of dealing with human error. However, other 
behavioral techniques as well appear promising on 
the basis of survey results. These techniques include 
OD techniques, work organization, programs to in- 
crease the frequency of safe job behaviors, improve- 
ments in company safety programs, redesign of 
safety equipment, and programs to reduce occupa- 
tional stress. 

Rhoton, W. A Procedure To Improve Compliance With 
Coal Mine Safety Regulations. J. of Organizational Behav. 
Manage., v. 2, No. 4, 1980, pp. 243-249. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of this study was to determine the effects 
of an intervention on. the rate of MSHA ventilation viola- 
tion notices. 

METHOD 

Data were collected from crews of unionized, under- 
ground coal miners. Coal was produced in each of four 
sections, during two out of three shifts. Each section 
had one supervisor who was responsible for the produc- 
tion and safety performance of the crew. Every section 
had between six and nine production employees, as well 
as several maintenance and support crews working. 
There was a total of 195 union employees and 30 exempt 
employees. 

The experimenter was a health and safety inspector 
from within the company's safety department. The out- 
come measure was the number of ventilation violation 
notices issued per month by MSHA inspectors. The 
experimenter's goal was to receive zero violation notices 
during the intervention phase. On a random basis, there 
was one inspection every week. During each inspection, 
five criti-cal performance variables were monitored: 
(a) making a methane gas check at the working face every 
20 min; (b) maintaining a flow of at least 3,000 tf/min of 
intake air behind the line brattice; (c) maintaining proper 
calibration of equipment methane monitors; (d) keeping 
the line brattice to within 10 ft of the working face; and 
(e) keeping the area behind the line brattice free of accu- 
mulation of loose coal dust. 

When the target behaviors were in compliance, the crew 
members and the supervisors were praised. Furthermore, 
graphic feedback of the ventilation violation notices were 



presented in the mine office. To supplement these graphs, 
verbal feedback was delivered biweekly by the experiment- 
er during regular safety meetings with the supervisors. 
When a section was found to be noncompliant, the experi- 
menter would stop production of coal until the hazardous 
condition was corrected. 

RESULTS 

During a 3-month baseline period, the mean number 
of ventilation citations issued per month was 2.6, based 
upon a mean of 13.3 inspection days per month. During 
the intervention phase, the mine operated for 10 consecu- 
tive months without a single ventilation citation. In the 
14th month of the investigation, there was a brief return to 
baseline. At that time, a citation was issued during each 
of two consecutive MSHA inspections. These inspections 
coincided with the week in which the experimenter was 
absent due to illness. With the return of the experiment- 
er to work, and consequent resumption of the systematic 
control mechanisms, the citations measure returned to 
zero. 

CONCLUSION 

The results of this study suggest that compliance with 
safety requirements can be increased with the use of 
frequent observation, contingent positive feedback, and 
praise. However, the relative contribution of each these 
components to producing the observed outcome is open to 
question. 

Sanders, M., T. Patterson, and J. Peay. The Effect of 
Organizational Climate and Policy on Coal Mine Safety 
(contract HO242039, U.S. Dep. Navy). BuMines OFR 
108-77, 1976, 180 pp.; NTIS PB 267 781. 

OBJECTIVE 

This study examined the causal influence of organiza- 
tional climate and policy on underground coal mine safety. 

METHOD 

Data on total injuries and employment hours per mine 
were obtained from the Bureau. Mines in five States 
(Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and 
Ohio) having at least 80 employees for 1972 and 1973 and 
working 1,600 employeehours per employee were selected 
to form a sampling pool. After percentile ranking of lost- 
time injury rates, mines in the top and bottom 30 pet of 
the industry for the two report years were proportionately 
selected within each state to insure a wide differential in 
accident rates. Percentile criteria were relaxed until a 
sufficient number of mines needed in each State had 
agreed to cooperate. 



36 



A total of approximately 250 miners from 22 mines 
completed questionnaires assessing 21 organizational 
climate, structure, and function dimensions on two occa- 
sions approximately 7 months apart. The responses for 
each item on the questionnaires were averaged across 
miners within each mine. The item means were then 
combined to yield climate scale scores for each mine. The 
21 dimensions were as follows: achievement motivation, 
autonomy, consistency of orders, cooperation among 
workgroups, decision decentralization, continued employee 
development, identification with company, innovative 
flexibility, feedback, management receptiveness, morale, 
new worker development, performance reward depen- 
dency, management planning, production pressure, shared 
authority, social relations among workers, structure, sup- 
port for workers, decision timeliness, and concern for 
working conditions. 

The association of the questionnaire data to the rates of 
lost- time injuries during 1972-1973 was assessed using a 
cross-lagged panel design. 

RESULTS 

The results strongly suggest that: 

1. When decisions are decentralized, when manage- 
ment is flexible and innovative in trying new procedures 
and programs, and when morale is high, disabling injuries 
decrease. 

2. As disabling injuries increase, feedback, continued 
employee development, and consistency of order improve, 
which then appear to decrease injuries. 

3. Production pressure appears to lead to an increase 
in disabling injuries, which in turn results in a decrease in 
production pressure. 

4. Mines in which management plans effectively tend 
to have a lower incidence of injury than other mines. 

5. Mines in which miners are given decision responsi- 
bility and autonomy tend to have a lower incidence of 
injuries than other mines. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Sanders concludes that, because his analyses are based 
on a cross-lagged panel design, there is clear evidence that 
organizational climate and management practices do affect 
the injury experience in underground coal mines, and are 
not simply the consequence of changes in the injury experi- 
ence. Sanders also proposes that training mine manage- 
ment in basic supervisory employee relations and planning 
skills would significantly impact on the injury rates of the 
mines. 



Uslan, S., H. Adeltnan, and R. Keller. Testing the Effects 
of Applied Behavioral Analysis and Applied Behavioral 
Management Techniques on the Safe Behaviors of Salt 
Mine Personnel (contract J0166137), Salt Inst.). BuMines 
OFR 44-80, 1978, 44 pp.; NTIS PB 80-171309. 

OBJECTIVE 

The purpose of the study was to demonstrate the effect 
of a training intervention (to teach use of positive social 
reinforcement) on the frequency of eye, hand, and back 
injuries at four salt mines. 

METHOD 

The intervention was called positive motivational safety 
training (POMOST). This training provides supervisors 
with: 

... an understanding about behavior and a process by 
which they can improve performance; increase safe 
work behaviors, help the employee feel better about 
himself, the company, and his job; and generally 
establish a work environment which is positively 
supportive. 

The principal reinforcer used in POMOST is praise, i.e., 
positive verbal feedback. POMOST instructs trainees in 
when and how to praise their employees. The program 
was taught in 22 to 40 h, depending on need. The 
program objectives were as follows: 

How to recognize unsafe behaviors. 

How to develop behavior baselines. 

How to determine what behaviors to change. 

How to communicate behavior change to employees. 

How to shape behaviors. 

How to maintain a safe work behavior program. 

This training discourages the use of punishment. Rather, 
emphasis is placed on the first line supervisor focusing the 
employees' attention on the appropriateness of their be- 
havior. The existence of inappropriate behavior is not 
ignored, but perceived as a training problem. 

Approximately 100 managers and supervisors from four 
plants were trained in the use of positive reinforcement 
for occurrences of safe behavior. Each supervisor was 
also provided manuals and other supportive materials. 
Additionally, following training, all supervisors were 
provided some coaching experience to keep the knowl- 
edge and capabilities gained during training from being 
extinguished. 



37 



Because of the high frequency of eye, head, hand, and 
back injuries, supervisors were asked to concentrate on 
shaping the following behaviors: 

SIMPLE BEHAVIORS-wear safety devices, lift correctly, 
drive safely, use tools properly, and maintain housekeeping 
standards. 

MORE COMPLEX BEHAVIORS-suggest better work 
methods, identify unsafe conditions, self-enforce safety 
practices, assist fellow workers who need help lifting, 
driving, loading, etc. 

A pre-training baseline was determined for each plant 
that identified rates of various types of accidents and 
injuries. The design was a before and after time series 
design. All the months prior to the onset of training 
represent the total number of premeasures; those sub- 
sequent to training represent all the measures of the post 
period. A 2 by 2 chi square contingency table was con- 
structed which compared the pre and post periods for the 
number of months in which the totals were above and 
below the means. 

In addition, a pre-training mean was computed sepa- 
rately for each site. Each post training total was then 
compared to determine the number of monthly totals 
which were above or below the pre-training mean. 

RESULTS 

Injury data were adjusted for total manhours at three of 
the four sites. The rates at two of these three sites show 
statistically significant decreases in injury rate frequencies, 
while the other site shows no change. In terms of frequen- 
cies unadjusted for hours of exposure, three experimental 
sites showed a decrease in injury frequency from pre to 
post training periods while the fourth showed an increase. 

The mean injuries of each of the four sites for the 
pre versus post periods were combined and an average 
of those means was computed. The average for the pre- 
intervention period was 10.83 injuries per month and 
the post intervention average was 9.28 injuries per month. 

Wagner, J. Time-Of-Day Variations in the Severity of 
Injuries Suffered By Mine Shiftworkers. Paper in Pro- 
ceedings of the 32nd Annual Meeting of the Human 
Factors Society. Anaheim, CA, 1988, 11 pp.; available 
upon request from J. Wagner, BuMines, Minneapolis, 
MN. 

OBJECTIVE 

This study examines the hypotheses that (1) the average 
severity of accidents experienced by operators of heavy 
mining equipment would be greater than for other types of 
mine employees, and (2) that this difference would be 
especially pronounced on the night shift. 



METHOD 

Based on the studies of industrial shiftworkers in 
France, Andlauer (2) suggests that accidents on the night 
shift are less frequent, but of greater severity than day 
shift accidents. It is argued that there may be an etiolog- 
ical relationship between accidents and greater nervous 
activity: at times of hyperactivity (or excitability) accidents 
are more frequent and less serious, while at times of hpyo- 
activity (or inhibition) accidents are less frequent, but 
more serious. Therefore, it is hypothesized: 

A worker performing automatically, especially during 
periods of low alertness and arousal, will tend to intro- 
duce few errors into his or her routine tasks, thereby 
limiting the likelihood of suffering an accident. How- 
ever, the inhibited state of psychological arousal cou- 
pled with a narrow conscious focus on the routine task 
at hand does not allow the employee to respond prop- 
erly to emergencies, thereby promoting the causation 
of relatively severe accidents. 

Wagner examined this hypothesis by comparing the 
average severity of accidents that involved the operation of 
heavy mining equipment versus accidents involving miners 
performing other types of activities-ones that presumably 
require less vigilance to perform the job safely. 

Accidents from 10 taconite 3 operations over a 10 yr 
period were considered. These surface mines and associ- 
ated ore processing plants are all located in northern 
Minnesota and Michigan. All of the 10 mining operations 
were similar in terms of equipment, mining and hauling 
techniques, work force requirement, and management 
approach. Most importantly, all worked an identical shift 
rotation for the full 10-yr period, a rotation which required 
weekly shift rotation with a run of night duty (7 nights) 
which always started on a Thursday night after 56 h of 
free time. 

Accidents were broken down according to the shift (day, 
afternoon, night) and according to whether the accident 
occurred during equipment operation (selected accidents) 
or during the course of performing some other type of 
activity (nonselected accidents). The average number of 
days lost per accident was used as the measure of accident 
severity. 

RESULTS 

The day shift accounted for 4,103 accidents, compared 
with 1,572 for afternoon, and 814 for night shift. Data 
are unavailable for normalizing these number, i.e., it was 
impossible to compute rates of accidents per employee 
hours of exposure. 



^aconite is a low-grade iron ore. 



38 



It was found that among selected accidents, the night 
shift accidents are more severe (24.38 days lost) than the 
accidents experienced on the day shift (19.96 days lost) or 
the afternoon shift (17.84 days lost). Among nonselected 
accidents, night shift accidents are also more severe, but 
by a much smaller margin compared with the other two 
shifts. These data appear to confirm findings by Andlauer 
(2) and others regarding automatic behavior and employ- 
ees' inability to respond adequately in emergency situa- 
tions during times such as the night shift when vigilance is 
difficult to maintain. 

In contrast to Wagner's finding that mobile equipment 
operators experience more severe accidents than other 



mine employees, Bennett (4) found that mobile equipment 
operators in the underground coal mining industry had the 
same probability of suffering a serious (lost time) injury as 
all other job classifications. There are several potential 
explanations for this discrepancy in findings. Wagner was 
looking at data from miners in the iron ore mining indus- 
try who were all working the same rotating shift schedule, 
whereas Bennett was comparing miners throughout the 
underground coal industry who were using different types 
of mobile equipment and who were working on a wide 
variety of different types of work schedules. Also, the 
two studies used different approaches to operationally 
define accident severity. 



* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 611-012/00,126 



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